Analysis of Purchasing Pools

Individuals or small groups assembled into a single entity for the purpose of purchasing health insurance. Purchasing pools often target uninsured workers whose employers do not offer health insurance or who are ineligible for benefits or cannot afford the premiums. The theory behind purchasing pools is to give small firms or individuals the same market power advantages that large firms enjoy when they purchase health insurance.

These are the nine performance dimensions against which we measured Purchasing Pools:

There is no direct evidence concerning the effect of purchasing pools on health spending:

  • No studies have examined the relationship between health spending and purchasing pools. Read more below
  • In theory, if purchasing pools increase levels of insurance coverage, use of health services would increase, resulting in increased health spending. Read more below

No studies have examined the relationship between health spending and purchasing pools.

There is no direct evidence of the effect of purchasing pools on overall health care spending. However, the literature indicates that unsubsidized purchasing pools have not been able to reduce premiums enough to induce non-insuring employers to participate. Therefore, pools have not extended coverage to the previously uninsured, so we would not expect an increase in overall health care spending from greater use of health care services within this group (Long and Marquis, 1999, 2001).

In theory, if purchasing pools increase levels of insurance coverage, use of health services would increase, resulting in increased health spending.

If purchasing pools extend coverage to previously uninsured people, we would expect to see an increase in health care use among the affected population, thus increasing overall health care spending. At the same time, a well constructed purchasing pool, which provides greater bargaining power and reduces administrative costs, has the potential to decrease premiums for all participants, thus lowering spending within this group. However, the reduction in administrative costs often includes reductions in compensation for insurance agents, providing an incentive for agents to steer employers away from the pool (Wicks and Hall, 2000), thus limiting participation. In turn, the pool's ability to gain bargaining power (i.e., the ability to negotiate a price that is better than what is available in the commercial market) is limited, as is the ability to achieve economies of scale and reduce premiums.

Moreover, the ability of a pool, even a well constructed one, to affect coverage or premiums, and thus spending, depends critically on the characteristics and rules of the insurance market in which it operates (e.g., whether rate variation based on health is allowed).

References

Long SH, Marquis MS, "Pooled Purchasing: Who Are the Players?" Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 105-111.

Long SH, Marquis MS, "Have Small-Group Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances Increased Coverage?" Health Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 154-163.

Wicks EK, Hall MA, "Purchasing Cooperatives for Small Employers: Performance and Prospects," The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 4, December 2000, pp. 511-546.

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Economic theory suggests that purchasing pools should concentrate consumer purchasing power and result in lower health insurance premiums; however, evidence from past and current purchasing pools fails to show this relationship:

  • Economic theory argues that purchasing pools should reduce health insurance premiums by concentrating the purchasing power of individuals and small employers and by reducing administrative overhead. Read more below
  • Studies of purchasing pools to date show that such pools have not been able to reduce premiums below those offered in the small group and individual health insurance markets. Read more below
  • Analysis of the problems of past and existing purchasing pools suggests that a variety of regulatory and policy options might improve the viability of purchasing pools and enhance their ability to decrease insurance premiums. Read more below

Economic theory argues that purchasing pools should reduce health insurance premiums by concentrating the purchasing power of individuals and small employers and by reducing administrative overhead.

One of the primary goals of purchasing pools is to reduce premiums for workers in small firms and for people previously in the individual market. The reduction in premiums is expected to occur because small employers and individual purchasers wield more power to negotiate lower prices with health insurers when acting as a group. In addition, large group purchasing can potentially reduce administrative costs and thus reduce the cost of coverage.

For purchasing pools to have an effect on consumer financial risk, they must increase the collective purchasing power of the small firms, giving them the leverage to negotiate lower rates of premiums. In addition, it is assumed that purchasing pools will take advantage of economies of scale in the marketing and administration associated with pooled purchasing (GAO, 2000; Yegian et al., 2000). Most important, it is assumed that these lower premiums induce non-insuring firms to participate in the pool, thus increasing coverage among the previously uninsured.

Studies of purchasing pools to date show that such pools have not been able to reduce premiums below those offered in the small group and individual health insurance markets.

The evidence suggests that purchasing pools, as currently implemented, have not been able to reduce premiums below those offered in the traditional small group and individual markets (Long and Marquis, 2001; GAO, 2000; Wicks, 2002) and thus have not increased coverage among the previously uninsured. Long and Marquis (2001) studied the three largest small group purchasing pools. They found no difference between the premiums inside and outside the purchasing pool for two of the three pools studied. In a study focused on the small group pool in California, Yegian et al. (2000) found that initially premiums in the pool were lower than those in the commercial market, but over the course of several years, those differences disappeared.

A report prepared by the GAO (2000) argues that there are several reasons that purchasing pools have not achieved premium reductions. First, they do not have sufficient leverage to negotiate better prices because their market share is small. Second, the expected savings in administrative costs have not been realized. Third, in some cases, state regulations limit variation in premium prices among different groups purchasing the same plan. A pool's viability depends critically on its ability to compete in the state's insurance marketplace. A pool is at a particular disadvantage in states that allow for rate variation based on health.

Moreover, for purchasing pools to succeed in offering reduced premiums, they must be able to maintain a sufficient number of participating insurers and employers. Insurance agents play a key role in helping small businesses to identify and select among their health insurance options. It has been argued that purchasing pools that do not solicit and maintain cooperation from insurance agents will not be able to attract enough employers to achieve the market share necessary to have the leverage to negotiate better prices (Trude and Ginsburg, 2001).

In addition, in an employee choice pool, i.e., a pool in which employers offer multiple plans and employees choose which one they want to participate in, little incentive is given for health plans to offer a better price through the pool than in the commercial market. This is because health plans in the commercial market can expect a more balanced risk profile in terms of the composition of members' health status and health care needs. In the commercial market, health plans would get the entire employee group, whereas in an employee choice pool, they would get only some portion of the group.

Analysis of the problems of past and existing purchasing pools suggests that a variety of regulatory and policy options might improve the viability of purchasing pools and enhance their ability to decrease insurance premiums.

It has been argued that purchasing pools would have the potential to reduce premiums if new regulations were implemented to address the problems described in the GAO report. Curtis and Neuschler (2005) argue that purchasing pools have not been able to achieve the same benefits for their participants as large employers do because the pools typically do not function as a cohesive group. Small employers and individual purchasers are able to move in and out of the pool and do so in an effort to find the best deal. This is not a problem for large employer groups because the employer's contribution to the premium is not available to employees if they do not take up the employer sponsored plan. Therefore, very few employees choose to purchase insurance in the commercial market because they would forgo a substantial benefit if they did so.

Curtis and Neuschler (2005) suggest several possible strategies for increasing group cohesion in purchasing pools that would enable the pools to maintain the size necessary to wield negotiating power with health plans: subsidies that would be available only to participating firms, mandatory participation (as in an individual or employer mandate), and allowing pools to use the same factors for rating that are used in the commercial market. In addition, Trude and Ginsburg (2001) suggest that pool participation could be increased if the pool incorporated a role for and worked with insurance agents rather than trying to bypass them and replicate their services. Another option for improving the ability of a pool to reduce premiums is for the pool to have a risk adjustment mechanism to account for any adverse selection that may occur in pools in which employees choose which plan they would like. In other words, pool payments to the health plans would be adjusted for how sick or healthy the plan participants are.

In Massachusetts, the Commonwealth Connector (a form of purchasing pool) has played a role in reducing the cost of health insurance for employees who do not receive insurance through their employer. The state requires that employers have a "Section 125 Plan" allowing employees to purchase health insurance through the Connector with pretax dollars (The Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, 2008). In this case, the purchasing pool in combination with a legislative change (i.e., requiring employers to allow employees to purchase insurance with pretax dollars) has reduced the cost of insurance for people who work but do not have access to insurance through their employer.

One of the key factors required for purchasing pools to succeed in offering reduced premiums is the ability to maintain a sufficient number of participating insurers and employers. Some of the pools succeed, but others have faced declining participation. Agents' cooperation may play a very important role in guiding employers to the pools. The literature does suggest some strategies for increasing the effectiveness of purchasing pools; however, there is little empirical evidence of how well these changes would work.

References

Curtis R, Neuschler E, Insurance Markets: What Health Insurance Pools Can and Can't Do? Oakland, Calif.: California HealthCare Foundation, Issue Brief, November 2005. As of May 6, 2009: http://www.chcf.org/topics/healthinsurance/index.cfm?itemID=117082

Long SH, Marquis MS, "Have Small-Group Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances Increased Coverage?" Health Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 154-163.

The Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, Report to the Massachusetts Legislature, Implementation of the Health Care Reform Law, Chapter 58, 2006-2008, October 2, 2008. As of January 13, 2009: http://www.mahealthconnector.org/ (search term: Report to the Massachusetts Legislature, Implementation of the Health Care Reform Law).

Trude S, Ginsburg PB, Tax Credits and Purchasing Pools: Will This Marriage Work? Washington, D.C.: Center for Studying Health System Change, Issue Brief No. 36, April 2001.

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Private Health Insurance: Cooperatives Offer Small Employers Plan Choice and Market Prices, Washington, D.C., GAO/HEHS-00-49, March 2000. (GAO's name changed in 2004 to U.S. Government Accountability Office.)

Wicks EK, Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives, New York, N.Y.: The Commonwealth Fund, Task Force on the Future of Health Insurance, Issue Brief No. 567, November 2002. As of November 20, 2008: http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=221530

Yegian JM, Buchmueller TC, Smith MD, Monroe AF, "The Health Insurance Plan of California: The First Five Years," Health Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 5, September/October 2000, pp. 158-165.

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In theory, purchasing pools reduce the administrative overhead of individual and small group policies; evidence thus far fails to support this relationship:

  • Economic theory suggests that purchasing pools should reduce the administrative overhead of individual and small group health insurance policies by creating economies of scale in the administration of such plans. Read more below
  • Studies of purchasing pools show that such pools have not been able to reduce administrative overhead more than have individual or small group policies. Read more below
  • The failure of purchasing pools to achieve adequate size may explain their inability to reduce administrative overhead; however, inefficiencies remain in other administrative processes. Read more below

Economic theory suggests that purchasing pools should reduce the administrative overhead of individual and small group health insurance policies by creating economies of scale in the administration of such plans.

Theoretically, purchasing pools reduce the administrative costs of individual and small group health plans by creating economies of scale in the administration of these plans. Such costs are, by definition, not wasteful, but they do emerge from the performance of repetitive and perhaps redundant functions for multiple consumers as opposed to one larger purchaser. If in fact the administrative overhead for coverage of individuals and small employer groups were to decrease with the implementation of purchasing pools, then in retrospect this excess administrative spending could be considered waste. To the extent that purchasing pools are able to improve the quality of care that pool participants receive, they have the potential to reduce inappropriate care and associated costs.

Administrative costs vary among individuals, small employers, and large employers, so purchasing pools would differentially affect different types of consumers. Administrative costs make up 30 to 40 percent of premiums for individual non-group policies (Pauly and Nichols, 2002), 20 to 25 percent for small employer groups, and 10 percent for large employer groups (GAO, 2001). Thus, the largest opportunity for waste reduction is in the small group and individual markets.

Studies of purchasing pools show that such pools have not been able to reduce administrative overhead more than have individual or small group policies.

Experience with purchasing pools thus far has not shown any decrease in administrative costs or waste.

The failure of purchasing pools to achieve adequate size may explain their inability to reduce administrative overhead; however, inefficiencies remain in other administrative processes.

Purchasing pools may have failed to reduce administrative overhead because they have not become large enough to achieve economies of scale.

Pools have not been able to attract and sustain participation for a number of reasons, the most important being that, in an effort to reduce administrative costs, they often reduce insurance agent compensation, thus providing an incentive for agents to steer employers away from the pool (Wicks and Hall, 2000). In addition, many times, the administrative functions of the health insurer are simply transferred to the purchasing pool, so the costs of administering policies to many small purchasers persist. Finally, in several instances, administrative services are duplicated, being performed simultaneously by the purchasing pool and the agent or health insurer (Wicks and Hall, 2000).

Even if purchasing pools ultimately did become large enough, we do not know whether they could achieve the economies of scale that would potentially decrease administrative costs. Further, it is not clear whether purchasing pools could ever achieve the same administrative efficiencies as large employer groups (Hall, 2002).

References

Hall MA, "Perspective: Of Magic Wands and Kaleidoscopes: Fixing Problems in the Individual Market," Health Affairs, Web Exclusive, October 23, 2002, pp. w353-w358.

Pauly MV, Nichols LM, "The Nongroup Health Insurance Market: Short on Facts, Long on Opinions and Policy Disputes," Health Affairs, Web Exclusive, October 23, 2002, pp. w325-w344.

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Private Health Insurance: Small Employers Continue to Face Challenges in Providing Coverage, Washington, D.C., GAO-02-8, October 2001.

Wicks EK, Hall MA, "Purchasing Cooperatives for Small Employers: Performance and Prospects," The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 4, December 2000, pp. 511-546.

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It is not clear whether purchasing pools can change the reliability of the health care system:

  • Purchasing pools may not include quality improvement activities in their purview. Read more below
  • Evidence from the literature has shown that large purchasing coalitions have tried to improve quality of care through increased public reporting of performance data. Read more below
  • We do not know whether the efforts of these purchasing coalitions have resulted in improvements in the reliability of care. Read more below
  • We also do not know whether smaller purchasing pools will have the same leverage as larger coalitions to push for improvements in quality. Read more below

Purchasing pools may not include quality improvement activities in their purview.

We do not know whether newly formed purchasing pools will elect to include quality improvement activities in their set of responsibilities. Since these activities can be expensive and time consuming, newly formed pools may not be able to include quality reporting or incentives in the first years of operation. In the absence of such activities, we would not expect to see an effect on reliability.

Evidence from the literature has shown that large purchasing coalitions have tried to improve quality of care through increased public reporting of performance data.

Although improving the quality of care is not the primary function of small group purchasing pools, it has been argued that they can exert their purchasing power toward that end. Quality of care can be improved through purchasing groups' efforts to acknowledge the importance of high quality care; measurement of quality of care, with rating of performance and recognition and rewards for better performance; and consumer education. Large purchasing groups have the leverage, willingness, and capability to monitor the health care delivery system and to identify and reward high quality performance (Castles, Milstein, and Damberg, 1999; Fraser et al., 1999).

The ability of the pool to promote high quality care is enhanced if the pool offers a standardized benefit across all plans so that consumers can easily make informed comparisons across all of the plan options. Such standardization will be possible only for pools that are able to compete successfully in the state's insurance marketplace. Therefore, the characteristics and rules of the insurance market in which the pool operates will affect its ability to improve the quality of care.

The literature shows that a number of large purchasing coalitions have promoted the public reporting of performance data in an effort to provide employers and employees with information about the value of the care they receive and to force the health care industry to compete on quality as well as cost (Sandrick, 2001; Castles, Milstein, and Damberg, 1999; Fraser et al., 1999; Borland, Smith, and Nankivil, 1994).

We do not know whether the efforts of these purchasing coalitions have resulted in improvements in the reliability of care.

The literature to date has focused on the ability of large purchasing coalitions to influence health care quality. It is not clear that small group coalitions will have the same leverage as larger coalitions to force providers to compete on quality as well as cost.

We also do not know whether smaller purchasing pools will have the same leverage as larger coalitions to push for improvements in quality.

Moreover, there is little evidence to determine which strategies used by purchasing coalitions to improve quality hold the most promise and under what circumstances they are most successful (Fraser et al., 1999).

References

Borland M, Smith C, Nankivil N, "A Community Quality Initiative for Health Care Reform," Managed Care Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1, Winter 1994 pp. 6-16.

Castles AG, Milstein A, Damberg CL, "Using Employer Purchasing Power to Improve the Quality of Perinatal Care," Pediatrics, Vol. 103, No. 1, Suppl., January 1999, pp. 248-254.

Fraser I, McNamara P, Lehman GO, Isaacson S, Moler K, "The Pursuit of Quality by Business Coalitions: A National Survey," Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 6, November/December 1999, pp. 158-165.

Sandrick K, "Raising the Bar: Purchasers and Providers Must Work Together to Meet the Quality-of-Care Challenge," Trustee, Vol. 54, No. 9, October 2001, pp. 12-17.

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Evidence suggests that purchasing pools are able to enhance patient experience by increasing the choice of health plans:

  • In theory, purchasing pools could broaden the range of health plan choices available to individuals and small employers over what is available in the non-group and small group insurance markets. Read more below
  • Several studies offer evidence that purchasing pools do increase health plan choice and that consumers value this choice. Read more below
  • However, not all purchasing pools result in increased choice for employees. The effect of this limitation on patient experience is unknown. Read more below

In theory, purchasing pools could broaden the range of health plan choices available to individuals and small employers over what is available in the non-group and small group insurance markets.

The details of a specific policy proposal to develop and implement purchasing pools will determine how effective the pool is at increasing the choice available to participants. One of the primary goals of purchasing pools is to offer a wider range of health plan choices to individuals and people working in small firms. The value of having a choice of health plans can be significantly enhanced by standardizing the benefits across plans in the pool. Then people can make an "apples-to-apples" comparison to find the plan that best meets their needs. The evidence from the literature suggests that purchasing pools, as currently implemented, have been successful at increasing the choice of plans available to pool participants (Long and Marquis, 2001; GAO, 2000).

Purchasing pools are designed to help individuals and small firms increase their bargaining power in the market and give them access to a wider range of plans. Therefore, it is the people working in small firms, the self-employed, and other individuals in the non-group market who would feel the effects of purchasing pools.

Several key assumptions underlie the relationship between purchasing pools and patient experience as discussed here. First, small firms are much less likely than other employers to offer health insurance to their employees; when they do offer coverage, they usually offer only a single plan (GAO, 2000; Cantor, Long, and Marquis 1995). Second, employees have heterogeneous preferences for insurance that employers cannot fully accommodate by offering a single insurance plan (Long and Marquis, 2001). Therefore, having additional choice provides value to employees.

Several studies offer evidence that risk pools do increase health plan choice and that consumers value this choice.

The evidence suggests that purchasing pools have been successful at offering a wider range of health plan choices to individuals and people working in small firms (Long and Marquis, 2001; GAO, 2000). Long and Marquis (2001) studied the three largest small group purchasing pools. They found that the small employers participating in the pools were more likely than other small employers to offer multiple plans. In addition, they observed that, within firms that offered a choice, employees enrolled in different plans, which suggests both that employees have heterogeneous preferences and that having multiple options provides value to employees. For example, many firms offered a health maintenance organization (HMO) as one of the options and allowed people with a preference for greater flexibility in choosing their doctors to select an alternative type of plan (e.g., fee for service, preferred provider organization, point of service).

The Massachusetts Commonwealth Connector, which acts much like a purchasing pool, has increased the choice of health plans available to participants. Though not all plans are available in all areas of the state, 42 different plans have been made available for purchase (The Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, 2008). The plans are semi-standardized into four basic categories: young adult plans (age 18 to 26), bronze, silver, and gold. The latter three categories are defined by the actuarial value of the respective plan, with gold plans having the most generous coverage and the highest cost. The variation in options is meant to offer participants the opportunity to choose the plan that best fits their needs both in terms of premium cost and plan design (The Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, 2008).

However, not all purchasing pools result in increased choice for employees. The effect of this limitation on patient experience is unknown.

For example, in the Municipal Employees Health Insurance Program (Connecticut), the nation's longest lasting small group purchasing pool, employers choose a single plan from all available plans in the pool to offer to employees (Silow-Carrol and Alteras, 2004). The employee is not able to choose among plans.

References

Cantor JC, Long SH, Marquis MS, "Private Employment-Based Health Insurance in Ten States," Health Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 199-211.

Long SH, Marquis MS, "Have Small-Group Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances Increased Coverage?" Health Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 154-163.

The Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, Report to the Massachusetts Legislature, Implementation of the Health Care Reform Law, Chapter 58, 2006-2008, October 2, 2008. As of January 13, 2009: http://www.mahealthconnector.org/ (search term: Report to the Massachusetts Legislature, Implementation of the Health Care Reform Law).

Silow-Carrol S, Alteras T, Stretching State Health Care Dollars: Building on Employer-Based Coverage, New York, N.Y.: The Commonwealth Fund, No. 781, October 29, 2004. As of January 22, 2008: http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/781_Silow-Carroll_stretching_employer.pdf?section=4039

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Private Health Insurance: Cooperatives Offer Small Employers Plan Choice and Market Prices, Washington, D.C., GAO/HEHS-00-49, March 2000.

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No evidence is available on the effects of purchasing pools on health:

  • No studies examine the relationship between purchasing pools and health. Read more below
  • In theory, if purchasing pools can expand coverage, particularly to those individuals with greater health care needs, they have the potential to improve health. Read more below
  • If purchasing pools attain adequate purchasing power, they may wield influence over providers to improve quality of care, which could yield improvements in health. Read more below

No studies examine the relationship between purchasing pools and health.

None of the literature about purchasing pools directly addresses their effect on health or quality of life; however, the literature does address the question of whether pools are able to expand coverage. The evidence suggests that the ability of a pool to expand coverage depends heavily on how it is designed. Purchasing pools, as currently implemented, have not achieved expanded coverage, in large part because they have not been able to reduce premium prices below those available in the commercial market (Long and Marquis, 1999, 2001) and thus have not been able to attract small employers that do not already offer coverage. However, it has been suggested that changes in the design of purchasing pools could help to increase group cohesion and enable the pools to maintain the size necessary to wield negotiating power with health plans. Such pool design options include providing subsidies that would be available only if participating in the pool, making participation mandatory (as in an individual or employer mandate), and allowing pools to use the same factors for rating that are used in the commercial market.

In theory, if purchasing pools can expand coverage, particularly to those individuals with greater health care needs, they have the potential to improve health.

If purchasing pools are able to expand coverage to previously uninsured individuals, they have the potential to improve health. However, the health effects of health insurance, although generally positive, may be more modest than generally appreciated; therefore, whether purchasing pools can improve health depends on both their ability to expand coverage and the extent to which health insurance improves health.

Some purchasing pools are designed to address the needs of high risk individuals who may be unable to purchase health insurance or who find policies unaffordable. In such cases, access to insurance through the purchasing pool could have a beneficial effect on health for highly vulnerable populations. However, such pools have to be subsidized in order for them to serve a high risk population at affordable prices and still be viable.

Any positive effect of purchasing pools on health would be expected to accrue primarily to people who had previously been uninsured and had gained coverage through the pool. The effect on health for others in the pool would be expected to be minimal.

If purchasing pools attain adequate purchasing power, they may wield influence over providers to improve quality of care, which could yield improvements in health.

Although improving the quality of care is not the primary function of small group purchasing pools, it has been argued that such pools can exert their purchasing power to improve the quality of care and thus improve health by improving quality. The quality of care can be improved through purchasing groups' efforts to acknowledge the importance of high quality care; to measure quality of care, and rate, recognize, and reward better performance; and to educate consumers. Large purchasing groups have the leverage and capability to monitor the health care delivery system and to identify and reward high quality performance (Castles, Milstein, and Damberg, 1999; Fraser et al., 1999).

References

Castles AG, Milstein A, Damberg CL, "Using Employer Purchasing Power to Improve the Quality of Perinatal Care," Pediatrics, Vol. 103, No. 1, Suppl., January 1999, pp. 248-254.

Fraser I, McNamara P, Lehman GO, Isaacson S, Moler K, "The Pursuit of Quality by Business Coalitions: A National Survey," Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 6, November/December 1999, pp. 158-165.

Long SH, Marquis MS, "Pooled Purchasing: Who Are the Players?" Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 105-111.

Long SH, Marquis MS, "Have Small-Group Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances Increased Coverage?" Health Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 154-163.

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The goal of purchasing pools is to increase insurance coverage; however, evidence thus far does not show this effect:

  • Purchasing pools are intended to increase insurance coverage in the individual and small group markets. Read more below
  • Purchasing pools to date have not been able to increase coverage levels. Read more below
  • Experts suggest that a number of regulatory changes could increase the viability of purchasing pools and, perhaps, enhance their ability to increase coverage. Read more below

Purchasing pools are intended to increase insurance coverage in the individual and small group markets.

One of the primary goals of purchasing pools is to increase insurance coverage, particularly among workers in small firms. Purchasing pools allow groups of small employers, individual consumers, or both, to band together to purchase health insurance on behalf of their members. The theory behind purchasing pools is to give small firms or individuals the same advantages (e.g., market power) that large firms enjoy when they purchase health insurance (GAO, 2000). Purchasing pools are intended to decrease premiums for their members through greater bargaining power, more stable health costs as a result of risk pooling, and lower administrative costs (Wicks, 2002). Lower premiums, in turn, are expected to encourage small employers that did not previously offer health insurance or uninsured individuals to join the purchasing pool.

Purchasing pools to date have not been able to increase coverage levels.

The evidence suggests that purchasing pools, as currently implemented, have not achieved increased coverage in small firms, largely because such pools have not been able to reduce premium prices below those available in the commercial market (Long and Marquis, 1999, 2001). This can be attributed to the pools being implemented in the form of employee choice, which means that employees are offered a choice of plans through the pool. In such models, adverse selection can be an issue if healthy people choose one plan and sick people choose another, thus dividing the employee group. Health plans can expect a more balanced risk profile in the commercial market, where they would get the entire employee group. Because purchasing pools have not been able to reduce their premiums, they have not been able to convince small employers that do not already offer insurance coverage to join the pool.

Experts suggest that a number of regulatory changes could increase the viability of purchasing pools and perhaps enhance their ability to increase coverage.

It has been argued that purchasing pools could potentially increase coverage if new regulations were implemented. For example, Wicks, Hall, and Meyer (2000) suggest several regulatory changes that could encourage the growth of purchasing pools, giving them a larger market share and thus a greater ability to negotiate and selectively contract with health plans. Similarly, HealthMarts and Association Health Plans (AHPs) have been proposed as alternatives to purchasing pools. HealthMarts and AHPs are similar to purchasing pools in that they use group purchasing to give small employers a greater ability to negotiate with health plans. The key difference is that HealthMarts and AHPs would be exempt from state benefit mandates and some state premium regulations, which could result in lower premiums.

Baumgardner and Hagen (2001/2002) used a simulation model to predict the effects of adopting HealthMarts and AHPs on insurance coverage. They found that 4.6 million small firm employees and dependents would obtain coverage through HealthMarts and AHPs; however, only 330,000 of those would be newly insured; the remainder would merely shift from the traditional small group market. Therefore, the effect of this policy option on coverage would be expected to be very small.

Moreover, expanding coverage too far may have unintended consequences. Pools with lenient membership criteria tend to attract higher risk individuals, causing health plans to increase premiums or drop out. For example, in Miami, the Community Health Purchasing Alliance (CHPA) had permissive membership policies that allowed very small businesses (i.e., one or two employees) to participate (Trude and Ginsburg, 2001). Such policies created the opportunity for high risk people who could not obtain insurance through the individual market to create fake businesses so that they could participate in the pool. In the end, this adverse selection contributed to the demise of the CHPA (Trude and Ginsburg, 2001).

Early experience in Massachusetts with health care reforms implemented in 2006 shows a substantial increase in insurance coverage, with 440,000 individuals being newly insured (The Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, 2008). Because multiple reforms were implemented at one time, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of individual reforms. The Commonwealth Connector serves as a type of purchasing pool and may have contributed to the growth in coverage. The Connector serves to organize the health insurance market for individuals and small groups, thus making it easier to compare and purchase plans. However, it seems unlikely that a large portion of the growth in coverage can be attributed to the Commonwealth Connector alone. Rather, it is more likely that the Connector helps to support the growth in coverage in response to the individual mandate.

References

Baumgardner JR, Hagen SA, "Predicting Response to Regulatory Change in the Small Group Health Insurance Market: The Case of Association Health Plans and HealthMarts" Inquiry, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 2001/2002, pp. 351-364.

Long SH, Marquis MS, "Pooled Purchasing: Who Are the Players?" Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 105-111.

Long SH, Marquis MS, "Have Small-Group Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances Increased Coverage?" Health Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 154-163.

The Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, Report to the Massachusetts Legislature, Implementation of the Health Care Reform Law, Chapter 58, 2006-2008, October 2, 2008. As of January 13, 2009:
http://www.mahealthconnector.org/ (search term: Report to the Massachusetts Legislature, Implementation of the Health Care Reform Law).

Trude S, Ginsburg PB, Tax Credits and Purchasing Pools: Will This Marriage Work? Washington, D.C.: Center for Studying Health System Change, Issue Brief No. 36, April 2001.

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Private Health Insurance: Cooperatives Offer Small Employers Plan Choice and Market Prices, Washington, D.C., GAO/HEHS-00-49, March 2000.

Wicks EK, Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives, New York, N,Y,: The Commonwealth Fund, Task Force on the Future of Health Insurance, Issue Brief No. 567, November 2002. As of November 20, 2008:
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=221530

Wicks EK, Hall MA, Meyer JA, Barriers to Small-Group Purchasing Cooperatives, Washington, D.C.: Economic and Social Research Institute, 2000.

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There is no evidence that purchasing pools will affect the capacity of the health care system:

  • Indirectly, if purchasing pools increase insurance coverage, they could increase the use of health care resources and strain capacity. Read more below

Indirectly, if purchasing pools increase insurance coverage, they could increase the use of health care resources and strain capacity.

Capacity refers to the availability of health care resources, such as personnel (e.g., doctors, nurses) and capital (e.g., hospital beds, medical equipment). It is possible that implementing purchasing pools could impose a strain on existing capacity. Whether such an effect is realized depends on the extent to which purchasing pools increase coverage of the previously uninsured and whether such coverage increases the use of health care services among this group.

A direct relationship between purchasing pools and capacity has not been established, and the literature has yet to examine such a relationship. However, the literature indicates that unsubsidized purchasing pools have not been able to reduce premiums enough to induce non-insuring employers to participate (Long and Marquis, 1999, 2001). Therefore, as currently implemented, pools have not extended coverage to the previously uninsured. Therefore, we would not expect a significant effect on capacity.

References

Long SH, Marquis MS, "Pooled Purchasing: Who Are the Players?" Health Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 105-111.

Long SH, Marquis MS, "Have Small-Group Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances Increased Coverage?" Health Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 154-163.

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Purchasing pools face difficult implementation and regulatory hurdles that will vary with the details of the policy.

  • Existing literature suggests that purchasing pools have had difficulty functioning as a cohesive group, and their lack of success in achieving lower premiums has challenged their viability. Read more below
  • Most analyses suggest that purchasing pool success could improve with a variety of ownership, regulatory, and legislative changes, all of which might be difficult to implement. Read more below

Existing literature suggests that purchasing pools have had difficulty functioning as a cohesive group, and their lack of success in achieving lower premiums has challenged their viability.

Whether purchasing pools are feasible to implement depends on the details of any specific proposal and the rules of the market in which the pool is going to operate. For example, a pool's ability to survive is significantly hampered in states that allow rate variation based on health.

In addition, the details of the proposed policy can affect its feasibility. For example, one policy option that has been suggested is to provide subsidies that could be used only in the purchasing pool. This would increase group stability and thus increase the pool's power to negotiate with health plans. However, policymakers may not want to allocate money just to increase the viability of purchasing pools. A more feasible alternative might be to target subsidies at low income populations in order to reduce the cost of insuring such vulnerable populations.

How a pool is organized and governed can have important implications for operational feasibility. For example, a pool managed by a public entity can have difficulty implementing necessary but unpopular changes, such as risk avoidance measures or rate increases needed to address adverse selection (i.e., if healthy people are more likely to choose one plan and sick people another). Because such a pool must be accountable to the public, even uncontroversial changes can take a long time to work their way through the process, thus limiting the ability of the pool to respond quickly to changes in the health care market.

As an alternative, the pool could be a privately run entity. The privately run pools might be better able to respond to changes in the health care market; however, concerns have been raised about whether a private entity would make decisions in the best interest of its members (Kofman, 2003). To address this concern, policymakers could require the privately run pool to have a board of directors that includes representatives of all key stakeholder groups (e.g., employers, employees, providers, and consumers) (Kofman, 2003).

There are two primary models of plan choice for purchasing pools of small employers, and each has different effects on operational feasibility. In some pools, such as the Municipal Employees Health Insurance Program (in Connecticut), employees are offered a single plan. In other pools, employees are offered a choice of plans. In such employee choice models, adverse selection can be an issue if healthy people are more likely to choose one plan and sick people another. Therefore, with employee choice, the pool will need to do some form of risk adjustment to account for differences in risk across the plans (i.e., the pool payments to the health plans would be adjusted for how sick or healthy the plan participants are). The need for risk adjustment can make employee choice models more difficult to implement and maintain.

Most analyses suggest that purchasing pool success could improve with a variety of ownership, regulatory, and legislative changes, all of which might be difficult to implement.

In general, the literature suggests several strategies for improving the effectiveness of purchasing pools. The majority of these strategies would require new regulations, which could reduce the operational feasibility of purchasing pools to some extent or, at the very least, increase the time it would take to implement them.

It has been argued that purchasing pools would have the potential to reduce premiums and increase coverage if new regulations were implemented. Curtis and Neuschler (2005) argue that purchasing pools have not been able to achieve the same benefits for their participants as large employers do because the pools typically do not function as a cohesive group. Small employers and individual purchasers are able to move in and out of the pool and do so in an effort to find the best deal. Such movement is not a problem for large employer groups because the employer's contribution to the premium is not available to employees if they do not take up the employer sponsored plan. Therefore, very few employees choose to purchase insurance in the commercial market because they would forgo a substantial benefit if they did so.

Curtis and Neuschler (2005) suggest several possible policy strategies to increase group cohesion in purchasing pools that would enable them to maintain the size necessary to wield negotiating power with health plans. These strategies include providing subsidies that would be available only to pool participants, making participation mandatory (through an individual or employer mandate), and allowing pools to use the same factors for rating that are used in the commercial market. Putting new regulations in place can be difficult and take a long time, which could reduce the operational feasibility of purchasing pools or at the very least increase the time needed to implement them.

Few studies have evaluated the effectiveness of such strategies. Thus, we do not know how easily such strategies could be implemented.

References

Curtis R, Neuschler E, Insurance Markets: What Health Insurance Pools Can and Can't Do? Oakland, Calif.: California HealthCare Foundation, Issue Brief, November 2005. As of May 6, 2009: http://www.chcf.org/topics/healthinsurance/index.cfm?itemID=117082

Kofman M, Group Purchasing Arrangements: Issues for States, Washington, D.C.: Academy Health, Issue Brief, SCI, Vol. IV, No. 3, April 2003.

 

 

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