Analysis of Open Access to Government Employee Program
This policy option at the federal level would allow people who are not federal employees, their dependents, or retirees to participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). The FEHBP is the health insurance program offered to federal employees (including members of Congress), their families, and retirees.
At the state level, this policy option would allow people who are not employees, their dependents or retirees to participate in state employee health benefit programs. Those programs vary widely across the states in terms of their benefits and premiums.
State employee health benefit programs exist in most states, however, the RAND COMPARE overview describes the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) only - and the analysis is particular to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). Conclusions drawn about the impact of expanding enrollment in the FEHBP may not apply to expansions of state employee health benefits programs.
These are the nine performance dimensions against which we measured Allow Open Access to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP):
Expanding access to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) would have no effect on overall health spending. There are no studies that directly link expanded access to FEHBP with spending:
- The literature that examines proposals to increase insurance coverage in general, and our modeling results specifically, suggests that expanding access to a program like FEHBP, especially with subsidization of premium costs, would have no effect on overall national health spending. Read more below
- Estimates of the magnitude of the effect depend heavily upon assumptions about the cost of premiums, the extent to which premiums would be subsidized, uptake levels by both the uninsured and those currently insured, and health spending changes with the provision of insurance. Read more below
The literature that examines proposals to increase insurance coverage in general, and our modeling results specifically, suggests that expanding access to a program like FEHBP, especially with subsidization of premium costs, would have no effect on overall national health spending.
Although there are no studies that directly link expanded access to FEHBP with spending, based on the findings from our modeling results for other policy options, we would expect that open enrollment in FEHBP would not increase overall spending for health care. For example, we found in modeling an individual mandate with generous subsidies and a high penalty, national health spending would increase about 1 percent, which we treat as being indiscernible from zero (see Individual Mandate, Spending).
FEHBP plan benefits are quite generous, and the premiums in the program are about $6,000 per year (Office of Personnel Management [OPM], not dated). Since it is anticipated that the pool of people interested in enrolling in FEHBP are on average sicker than federal employees, the premiums would likely be even higher. The high price of FEHBP plans, given the plans' current benefit design and generosity, would likely limit enrollment in the program without some kind of subsidy. A low income level is associated with low rates of purchase of private health insurance (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008), and since two-thirds of the uninsured have incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty level (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007), the high price of these plans would otherwise be prohibitive for most individuals and would limit uptake. The availability of an adequate subsidy will increase enrollment and transfer more of the costs to the federal government. The type of subsidy and its size will significantly affect the number of uninsured who choose to enroll in FEHBP and will also affect spending for the program.
The availability of a tax credit for purchase of an FEHBP plan may risk the crowd out of some kinds of employer sponsored coverage if employers decide to drop coverage because of the availability of an alternative subsidized mechanism for employees to purchase health insurance. If individuals move from employer sponsored coverage with some tax subsidization to the individual market with even larger subsidies, the subsidy may end up only slightly reducing the number of uninsured for a very high price.
For example, Gruber considers how a tax credit for individuals earning between $15,000 and $30,000 (credit amount $6,000) and families earning between $30,000 and $60,000 (credit amount $15,000) per year could affect spending. In his model, if the goal is to reduce the number of uninsured by 10 million, the tax credit must encourage 13 million people to enroll, since 3 million people would lose their employer sponsored coverage. To cover the cost of the tax credit, the government would also have to spend $6,100 per newly insured beneficiary (or a total of $61.5 billion), whereas the actual cost of coverage for each newly insured beneficiary would be only $2,700 (Gruber, 2008).
Estimates of the magnitude of the effect depend heavily upon assumptions about the cost of premiums, the extent to which premiums would be subsidized, uptake levels by both the uninsured and those currently insured, and health spending changes with the provision of insurance.
The effect of this policy option on overall health care spending will depend on several factors:
The costs of purchasing a policy within FEHBP. FEHBP plans are generous and therefore expensive, and enrollment will be limited if there are no subsidies.
The size of any potential subsidy, the type of subsidy, and the subsidy's effect on crowd out of employer sponsored coverage. The availability of a tax credit for purchase of an FEHBP plan may lead some employers to drop coverage for their employees. While there are tax related costs for employer sponsored coverage, the costs to the federal government can be even higher with a tax credit for purchase of an FEHBP plan; as a result, crowd out of employer sponsored coverage can increase costs. Income related subsidies, which can perhaps more precisely target an individual's financial needs, may somewhat mitigate the crowd-out effect but, as described below, the presence of an individual mandate could increase enrollment in the program, thus augmenting the effectiveness of any type of subsidy (Lambrew and Gruber, 2006/2007). In modeling an individual mandate, we found that the availability of a subsidy, in the absence of a penalty for failure to purchase insurance, increases coverage by about 22 percent (see Individual Mandate, Coverage).
The difference in health spending between the uninsured and those with insurance. The magnitude of the spending increase would also be affected by the extent to which previously uninsured individuals enroll in FEHBP. Typically, the insured spend more on medical care than those without insurance. While the uninsured do get some medical care, they have lower rates of preventive care, are diagnosed at more advanced disease stages, and receive less therapeutic care than those with insurance. In 2004, individuals with private insurance consumed $2,975 per year in medical care, compared with $1,629 per year for the uninsured (Hadley and Holahan, 2004).
In theory, as individuals remain insured and receive more primary care prevention, they should become healthier and spend less on health care. However, this decrease in spending has not generally been observed. For example, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment generally found that spending increased with more generous insurance without clear health improvements; nonetheless, it did conclude that, for low income chronically ill patients, primary care and disease management could prevent more costly care in the future (Gruber, 2006).
The presence or absence of an individual or employer mandate. The presence of an individual mandate could also affect spending related to FEHBP, in that, along with a subsidy, an individual mandate can increase enrollment in the program. Mandates to purchase insurance can balance health risk within an insurance pool by forcing the young and healthy to purchase insurance. A more balanced health insurance pool should lower the costs of an experience rated health plan (a plan that incorporates past experience, benefit changes, and a profit allowance). On the other hand, higher levels of participation translate into higher health care spending by the individual (and by the government if there are subsidies). See our modeled estimates of the effects of Individual Mandate and Employer Mandate for more information.
Lambrew and Gruber modeled the effects of a combination of subsidies and mandates in terms of the numbers of uninsured who gain health insurance and in terms of overall spending. Spending estimates vary considerably: With no mandate and less generous subsidies, the costs (in 2003) to the federal government were estimated to be $26 billion, whereas with a more generous subsidy and an individual mandate, the costs were estimated at $114 billion (Lambrew and Gruber, 2006/2007).
The ability of FEHBP to control health care spending. OPM negotiates premiums for FEHBP plans with participating health plans. OPM has had variable success in controlling the growth in premiums within FEHBP plans. Premium growth over time has varied from a high of 12.9 percent in 2002 to a low of 1.8 percent in 2007. These rates are slightly lower than the rates experienced by other large group employers. In 2007, among the ten largest FEHBP plans, growth in premiums varied from 0 percent to 15.5 percent. However, these rates of premium growth are not an entirely straightforward measure, since premiums are affected by withdrawal of reserve funds. In 2007, withdrawals from reserves offset the projected increases in premiums by 5 percent (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2006).
Potential administrative savings from those transitioning from individual insurance and small group policies to an FEHBP policy minus the administrative start-up costs of the program. Since individual insurance policies have much higher administrative costs than FEHBP plans, there may be small savings from lower administrative costs if insured individuals move from individual policies to FEHBP plans. Administrative costs in the individual market include 40 percent of revenues and up to 18 percent in the small group market (Thorpe, 1992). These are much higher than the administrative costs of roughly 10 percent within FEHBP plans. Furthermore, the profit margins for private insurance companies in FEHBP are lower than in the individual insurance market (0.5-1 percent, compared with 10 percent), so this could decrease overall costs as well (based on a conversation with John Bertko, March 4, 2008).
There are no current estimates for the administrative start-up costs for this type of program; however, such costs might be significant. Some information may be gleaned from the start-up costs for Medicare Part D (the prescription drug benefit). These costs involved establishing a Web site and phone service for application to the program, community outreach, management of bidding, a system to deduct premiums from Social Security payments, and a means to identify low income beneficiaries who might be eligible for a subsidy. The Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act appropriated $1 billion to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and $500 million to the Social Security Administration for administrative start-up costs for the program (GAO, 2007; Romig, 2007).
References
Gruber J, The Role of Consumer Copayments for Health Care: Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment and Beyond, Menlo Park, Calif.: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, No. 7566, October 30, 2006.
Gruber J, Covering the Uninsured in the U.S., Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 13758, January 2008. As of November 3, 2008: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13758
Hadley J, Holahan J, The Cost of Care for the Uninsured: What Do We Spend, Who Pays, and What Would Full Coverage Add to Medical Spending? Menlo Park, Calif.: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, No. 7084, Issue update, May 10, 2004.
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, The Uninsured: A Primer, Menlo Park, Calif. October 2007.
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, How Non-Group Health Coverage Varies with Income, Menlo Park, Calif., February 2008.
Lambrew J, Gruber J, "Money and Mandates: Relative Effects of Key Policy Levers in Expanding Health Insurance Coverage to All Americans," Inquiry, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2006/2007, pp. 333-344.
Romig K, "CRS Report for Congress," Social Security Administration: Administrative Budget Issues, RS22677, June 13, 2007.
Thorpe KE, "Inside the Black Box of Administrative Costs," Health Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer 1992, pp. 41-55.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Federal Employee Health Benefits Program: Premium Growth Has Recently Slowed and Varies Among Participating Plans, GAO-07-141, Washington, D.C. December 2006.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services: Internal Control Deficiencies Resulted in Millions of Dollars of Questionable Contract Payments, GAO-08-54, Washington, D.C., November 15 2007.
U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), "2008 FEHB Premiums: Non-Postal Premium Rates for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program," Washington, D.C.: not dated. As of April 8, 2009: http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/rates/2008non_postal_ffs.pdf
The effect on consumer financial risk of expanded access to FEHBP plans depends heavily on program structure, including the cost of premiums and the existence and size of subsidies:
- In theory, FEHBP enrollment will increase consumer financial risk variably depending on the costs of the premiums, the generosity of the benefits in terms of out-of-pocket costs, the availability of subsidies, and the presence of a mandate to purchase insurance. Read more below
In theory, FEHBP enrollment will increase consumer financial risk variably depending on the costs of the premiums, the generosity of the benefits in terms of out-of-pocket costs, the availability of subsidies, and the presence of a mandate to purchase insurance.
There are no studies that directly link consumer financial risk and opening access to FEHBP plans to a broader pool of enrollees. With simple open enrollment in FEHBP without a subsidy or mandate, all the costs of enrollment would fall on individuals, although the high price of these plans would likely be prohibitive and limit uptake. If premiums are age adjusted, then older individuals will face higher costs than younger enrollees. In addition, if some individuals lose employer sponsored coverage through crowd out (i.e., if employers decide to drop coverage because of the availability of an alternative subsidized mechanism for employees to purchase health insurance), those individuals could face higher costs. The costs for individuals could be mitigated by subsidies.
Since uninsured individuals are generally sicker than those with insurance, a separate risk pool would need to be established for nonfederal employees so that the premiums of federal employees would not be adversely affected. In addition, there are some thoughts that the problems of risk segmentation and adverse selection within FEHBP plans could be minimized by age adjusting the premiums of enrollees to better reflect the actuarial value of the plan (Moffit, 2001).
The table shows the individual rates for several of the national (nonpostal) fee-for-service plans within the FEHBP for 2008. The premiums listed include both the beneficiary and government contributions.
National Nonpostal Individual FEHBP Rates
| Name of Plan | Monthly Total Premium ($) | Annual Premium ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Blue Cross/Blue Shield Standard | 448.91 | 5,386.92 |
| Blue Cross/Blue Shield Basic | 339.17 | 4,070.04 |
| APWU High | 416.24 | 4,994.88 |
| APWU CDHP | 354.42 | 4,253.04 |
| GEHA High | 512.44 | 6,149.28 |
| GEHA Standard | 288.41 | 3,460.92 |
SOURCE:OPM, not dated.
NOTES: APWU = American Postal Workers Union, CDHP = consumer driven health plan, and GEHA = Government Employees Health Association. It is expected that the pool of those interested in enrolling in FEHBP is on average sicker than federal employees; therefore, the premiums will likely be even higher.
FEHBP plans vary significantly in terms of benefits and out-of-pocket costs, and the premiums do not always reflect the generosity of benefits. Health insurance companies that participate in FEHBP establish premiums in two ways. They may use experience rating, whereby individual plans project costs of serving FEHBP enrollees and of incorporating past experience, benefit changes, and a profit allowance of 0.5-1 percent; or they may use community rating, whereby a plan reports rates charged to two employer groups whose membership most parallels FEHBP enrollment and then picks the lower of these two, adjusting for the demographic characteristics or the different benefit package for the FEHBP enrollees. Each national plan offers a set premium, regardless of the enrollee's geographic location. None of the plans adjusts for health risks or demographics, but local plans do adjust for geographic variation in health care costs.
Within a particular geographic location, however, higher premiums do not always buy a more comprehensive benefit package, in part because, over time, some plans attract enrollees with a greater number of health care needs and then the experience rating of this group tends to drive up the price of the plan. In particular, the number of enrolled retirees who are not yet of Medicare age (these are generally sicker beneficiaries) tend to significantly affect health plan cost (Enthoven, 1989). Thus, in some areas, a health maintenance organization (HMO) plan, which is generally more restrictive, may be more expensive than a preferred provider organization plan (Merlis, 2003).
References
Enthoven AC, "Effective Management of Competition Within the FEHBP," Health Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3, Fall 1989, pp. 33-50.
Merlis M, The Federal Employees Health Benefit Program: Program Design, Recent Performance, and Implications for Health Care Reform, Menlo Park, Calif.: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, No. 6081, May 30, 2003.
Moffit RE, "Recent Premium Increases and the Future of the FEHBP," Congressional Subcommittee Testimony, Washington, D.C., October 16, 2001. As of November 3, 2008: http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/Test101601.cfm
U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), "2008 FEHB Premiums: Non-Postal Premium Rates for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program," Washington, D.C., not dated. As of April 8, 2009: http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/rates/2008non_postal_ffs.pdf
There are no studies that evaluate whether expanding access to FEHBP would affect waste; however:
- Differences in the administrative overhead between different types of insurance may lead to changes in the administrative burden for new FEHBP enrollees. Read more below
Differences in the administrative overhead between different types of insurance may lead to changes in the administrative burden for new FEHBP enrollees.
The administrative costs of health insurance could decrease if the individuals who enroll in FEHBP switch from individual or small group employer policies, in which these costs are higher. The overall complexity of a multiple-payer multiple-provider system, which can lead to redundancies and inefficiencies, would not necessarily be expected to change with this policy option. In addition, we would not expect the amount of clinical or operational waste in the U.S. health care system to change significantly with open enrollment into FEHBP.
While individual and small group policies may be inherently more expensive for health plans to administer, we assume that decreasing administrative costs through the pooling of individuals constitutes a decrease in unnecessary spending or waste.
When the administrative costs of the health plans, OPM, and the respective agencies are tallied, most preferred provider organization plans within FEHBP have administrative costs of 7-10 percent of claims paid, and HMOs have costs of up to 15 percent of claims paid. In comparison, administrative costs in the individual market include 40 percent of revenues and up to 18 percent in the small group market (Thorpe, 1992). These are much higher than the administrative costs within FEHBP of roughly 10 percent. Furthermore, the profit margins for private insurance companies in FEHBP are lower than those in the individual insurance market (0.5-1 percent compared with 10 percent), so this difference could decrease overall costs as well (based on a conversation with John Bertko on March 4, 2008). However, we do not yet know if there will be efficiencies gained through economies of scale from a large number of new enrollees in FEHBP.
References
Thorpe KE, "Inside the Black Box of Administrative Costs," Health Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer 1992, pp. 41-55.
Evidence suggests that there is no relationship between increased access to FEHBP and reliability:
- Evidence suggests that reliability is not significantly affected by insurance status. Read more below
Evidence suggests that reliability is not significantly affected by insurance status.
The reliability of care reflects the level at which a health care system delivers evidence based (that is, safe and effective) medical care to the population. Although those who are insured use more services than those who are uninsured, the care they receive is not necessarily more reliable. Therefore, even if this policy option expands coverage to some individuals who are currently uninsured, we would not expect the reliability of the system to change. We assume that under a new FEHBP, there are not any additional regulations for quality of care than those already imposed on participating plans.
Studies looking at the reliability of care do not find consistent differences between insured and uninsured people. RAND Corporation studies using the QA Tools found few differences in the reliability of care for those with insurance compared with those without it. There were no large differences even when looking at specific types of care (acute, chronic, or preventive) or functions of care (screening, diagnosis, treatment, or follow-up) (McGlynn at al., 2003; Asch et al., 2006). Several other studies also found no differences in reliability between insured and uninsured people. Leape et al. (1999) found no overall differences in underuse of coronary revascularization between uninsured and insured people. Young et al. (2001) found that "insurance and income had no effect on receipt of appropriate care for depressive and anxiety disorders." Harman, Edlund, and Fortney (2004) found disparities in initiation of depression treatment between uninsured and insured people, but no differences in quality of care once treatment was initiated.
References
Asch SM, Kerr EA, Keesey J, Adams JL, Setodji CM, Malik S, McGlynn EA, "Who Is at Greatest Risk for Receiving Poor-Quality Health Care?" New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 354, No. 11, March 16, 2006, pp. 1147-1156.
Harman JS, Edlund MJ, Fortney JC, "Disparities in the Adequacy of Depression Treatment in the United States," Psychiatric Services, Vol. 55, No. 12, December 2004, pp. 1379-1385.
Leape LL, Hilborne LH, Bell R, Kamberg C, Brook RH, "Underuse of Cardiac Procedures: Do Women, Ethnic Minorities, and the Uninsured Fail to Receive Needed Revascularization?" Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 130, No. 3, February 2, 1999, pp. 183-192.
McGlynn EA, Asch SM, Adams J, Keesey J, Hicks J, DeCristofaro A, Kerr EA, "The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States," New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 348, No. 26, June 26, 2003, pp. 2635-2645.
Young AS, Klap R, Sherbourne CD, Wells KB, "The Quality of Care for Depressive and Anxiety Disorders in the United States," Archives of General Psychiatry, Vol. 58, No. 1, January 2001, pp. 55-61.
There are no studies examining the link between expanded access to an FEHBP plan and patient experience; however:
- "Theory suggests that the experience of previously uninsured patients, whose care is hindered by difficulties in access and continuity of care, would improve when these patients acquire health insurance and would mirror the (generally positive) patient experience of currently insured individuals. Read more below
- We do not know whether the patient experience of new FEHBP enrollees will reflect that of current beneficiaries. Read more below
Theory suggests that the experience of previously uninsured patients, whose care is hindered by difficulties in access and continuity of care, would improve when these patients acquire health insurance and would mirror the (generally positive) patient experience of currently insured individuals.
The effect of this policy option on patient experience largely depends on its ability to extend insurance coverage to those who are currently uninsured. If this policy option increases insurance coverage, we would expect that those who newly obtain insurance coverage should have experiences in the health care system that mirror those of people with insurance. People who are insured enjoy greater access to care, are more likely to have a regular source of care, and have more options in their choice of doctors. This perspective assumes that the experiences of newly enrolled individuals in an open FEHBP will be similar to those of individuals already enrolled in the program, when in fact there may be significant differences between these groups other than insurance status. In particular, the premiums of federal employees are highly subsidized, which likely positively affects satisfaction with the health plan.
While coverage expansion should extend these benefits to those who are currently uninsured, an increase in demand for care may strain current capacity. And other aspects of patient experience, such as timeliness of access to specialty or primary care, may be negatively affected. The net effect of the mandate on patient experience would probably still be positive, but it would be mitigated by issues related to capacity.
We do not know whether subsidies would be large enough to actually encourage enrollment in this program. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the number of newly insured individuals and the potential effect that limited capacity might have on patient experience.
We also recognize that, even among individuals with health insurance, there are variations in patient experience based on race, ethnicity, and geographic location. We would not expect that this policy option to expand coverage would necessarily change these factors.
Zuvekas and Taliaferro (2003) and Schoen et al. (2004) have associated insurance coverage with access, and Newacheck et al. (1998) has found that uninsured children are less likely (75.9 percent versus 96.2 percent) to have a usual source of care. Significant racial disparities exist even among the insured (Zuvekas and Taliaferro, 2003). High volume providers suffer from "lower rates of preventive services delivery, lower patient satisfaction, and a less positive doctor-patient relationship" (Zyzanski et al., 1998).
We do not know whether the patient experience of new FEHBP enrollees will reflect that of current beneficiaries.
Each year, the OPM surveys FEHBP enrollees in plans with more than 500 members. Using the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS), OPM solicits information about overall plan satisfaction, access to needed care, timeliness of care, communication with physicians, customer service, and claims processing (OPM, not dated). These results are published on the OPM Web site, and consumers can compare health plan ratings. Use of these consumer report cards does seem to influence health plan choice, even after controlling for premiums, expected out-of-pocket expenses, and covered services (Wedig and Tai-Seale, 2002). In 2003, the director of OPM reported that 78.9 percent of fee-for-service and 62.7 percent of HMO FEHBP enrollees reported being satisfied with their health plan, compared with the industry average of 61.8 percent (Owcharenko, 2003).
Geographic region may affect the patient experience of new enrollees. While all FEHBP enrollees have access to the national plans, in rural areas, this apparent choice may be limited by the selective contracting of plans with local providers. Whereas just 30 percent of rural areas had enrollees in ten or more of the national plans, 86 percent of metropolitan areas had enrollees in ten or more plans (McBride et al., 2003a). One explanation for this difference is that not all plans contract with the closest primary care providers within rural communities, and so enrollees in these areas would face significant out-of-network costs to see a local provider if they selected particular national plans (McBride et al., 2003b).
References
McBride T, Andrews C, Mueller K, Shaumbaugh-Miller M, "An Analysis of Availability of Medicare + Choice, Commercial HMO, and FEHBP Plans in Rural Areas: Implications for Medicare Reform," RUPRI Rural Policy Brief, Vol. 8, No. 5, March 2003a.
McBride T, Mueller K, Andrews C, Xu L, Fraser R, "Enrollment in FEHBP Plans in Rural America: What Are the Implications for Medicare Reform?" RUPRI Rural Policy Brief, Vol. 8, No. 8, June 2003b.
Newacheck PW, Stoddard JJ, Hughes DC, Pearl M, "Health Insurance and Access to Primary Care for Children," The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 338, No. 8, February 1998, pp. 513-519. As of November 4, 2008: http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/abstract/338/8/513
Owcharenko N, Giving Rural Seniors a Choice of Health Plans: The FEHBP Model for Medicare Reform, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, April 17, 2003. As of November 4, 2008: http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm258.cfm
Schoen C, Osborn R, Huynh PT, Doty M, David K, Zapert K, Peugh J, "Primary Care and Health System Performance: Adults' Experience in Five Countries," Health Affairs, Web Exclusives, October 28, 2004. As of November 4, 2008: http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.487v1.pdf
U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), "2008 FEHB Premiums: Non-Postal Premium Rates for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program," Washington, D.C.: not dated. As of April 8, 2009: http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/rates/2008non_postal_ffs.pdf
Wedig GJ, Tai-Seale M, "Effect of Report Cards on Consumer Choice in the Health Insurance Market," Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 21, No 6, November 2002, pp. 1031-1048.
Zuvekas SH, Taliaferro GS, "Pathways to Access: Health Insurance, the Health Care Delivery System, and Racial/Ethnic Disparities, 1996-1999," Health Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2, March/April 2003, pp. 139-153.
Zyzanski SJ, Stange KC, Langa D, Flocke SA, "Trade-Offs in High-Volume Primary Care Practice," Journal of Family Practice, Vol. 46, No. 5, May 1998, pp. 397-402.
Expanding access to FEHBP will improve health to the degree to which health insurance in general improves health:
- Â There are no studies that directly link improvements in the health of enrollees or the health of the population as a whole with expanded access to FEHBP. Read more below
- Evidence suggests that on the whole, health status improves with the provision of health insurance. Read more below
- The magnitude of the effect will vary depending on baseline health status. Read more below
- Barriers to access that are not related to insurance may lessen the effects on health of new insurance coverage. Read more below
There are no studies that directly link improvements in the health of enrollees or the health of the population as a whole with expanded access to FEHBP.
Clearly, one of the limitations of studying the relationship between health insurance and health is the difficulty in designing studies in which the magnitude of the effect of insurance can be properly evaluated. True experimental designs in which some individuals are randomized to receive literally "no insurance" would present significant ethical issues. Previous insurance expansions do give insight into particular subgroups, such as pregnant women and children, but results from these studies may not be valid for the whole population. While there have been many observational studies that show that the uninsured are in worse health than the insured, these studies do not allow us to estimate how much a policy option to expand insurance coverage might improve health. Other challenges include the inconsistencies between studies in how health status is measured, the variability in controlling for other factors that affect health, and the lack of detail in differentiating among different types of insurance benefit packages.
The relationship between health insurance and health can also be challenging to study in that it can be difficult to demonstrate causality in the relationship. In many cases, health status affects health insurance status. For example, sick individuals may be unable to purchase individual policies or obtain employer sponsored coverage; on the other hand, when these individuals become sick enough, they may qualify for a government sponsored program. Thus, when researchers attempt to study differences in health based on health insurance status, it can be difficult to discern whether lack of insurance is really causing worse health.
Evidence suggests that on the whole, health status improves with the provision of health insurance.
Inasmuch as this policy option results in changes in insurance coverage, it has the potential to affect health. Increases in health insurance coverage should improve access to medical care and result in improved health.
Hadley (2003) reviewed the literature from the previous 25 years on this subject and found general consensus among studies that providing the uninsured with health insurance would result in improved health status. The "best guess" size of the effect is that mortality would decrease anywhere from 4 to 25 percent for previously uninsured people. While he cites substantial methodological difficulties within these studies, he acknowledges the substantial consistency in the findings of improved health with insurance in many populations and among many types of disease.
The magnitude of the effect will vary depending on baseline health status.
For example, the health of previously uninsured young, healthy people is not expected to change as much as the health of people with a chronic illness.
Additionally, health insurance coverage may improve the health of the near-elderly who are denied coverage in the current system. For example, those in the 50-64 age group may be more likely to obtain coverage for serious health conditions. Further, there may be differences across subgroups in the degree to which health insurance results in changes in realized access to care. In the case of a high deductible health plan, an individual who is unable to afford the deductible may still not be able to receive medical care. Lack of access to medical care because of geographic barriers may also not necessarily change just because insurance status changes, and systemwide racial or ethnic barriers to care may not be significantly affected.
Barriers to access that are not related to insurance may lessen the effects on health of new insurance coverage.
Medical care represents only one of the many determinants of health (others being behavior, socioeconomic status, education, and genetics, for example). Thus, improved access to medical care via insurance changes may have only a modest effect on health. In addition, there are other important determinants of access besides health insurance coverage.
References
Hadley J, "Sicker and Poorer—The Consequences of Being Uninsured: A Review of the Research on the Relationship Between Health Insurance, Medical Care Use, Health, Work, and Income," Medical Care Research and Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, Suppl, June 1, 2003, pp. 3S-75S.
Open access to FEHBP should increase insurance coverage:
- While we expect insurance coverage to increase, enrollment in the program will depend heavily on the cost of premiums, the size of subsidies and/or tax credits, and the presence or absence of an accompanying mandate to purchase insurance. Read more below
- The effect of this policy option on coverage may be mitigated by crowd out of employer sponsored coverage. Read more below
While we expect insurance coverage to increase, enrollment in the program will depend heavily on the cost of premiums, the size of subsidies and/or tax credits, and the presence or absence of an accompanying mandate to purchase insurance.
Even though there are no studies that enable us to directly evaluate changes in coverage that would result from expanding access to FEHBP, open access to the program should increase insurance coverage in the population by creating a purchasing pool to insure individuals who might not otherwise have access to coverage. However, because FEHBP benefit packages are generous and the premiums quite high, the magnitude of this effect will depend largely on the size of any accompanying subsidies and the presence of mandates to purchase insurance. We assume that for there to be any significant uptake of FEHBP insurance, there would have to be large subsidies for purchasing it. An FEHBP buy-in could also lead to "crowd out" of employer sponsored coverage and could even destabilize the employment based insurance market, thus potentially lessening the increase in coverage.
Without a mandate to purchase insurance, we would expect that the near-elderly and the chronically ill who currently face challenges in purchasing insurance in the individual insurance market would be most interested in buying into an FEHBP plan. The presence of a mandate may create a more even demand among those who are healthy without insurance.
FEHBP benefits are quite generous, and the premiums in the program are about $6,000 per year (OPM, not dated). Since it is anticipated that people interested in enrolling in FEHBP are, on average, sicker than federal employees, the premiums would likely be even higher. Low income level is associated with low rates of purchase of private health insurance (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008), and two-thirds of those who are uninsured have incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty level (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007). Therefore, for this policy to have any impact on coverage, it would have to be accompanied by some kind of subsidy.
The effect of this policy option on coverage may be mitigated by crowd out of employer sponsored coverage.
Subsidies for FEHBP plans may create crowd out among small employers, which could increase demand among employees who formerly had employer sponsored coverage.
Gruber (2008) modeled the effects of tax credits for purchase of health insurance on crowd out of employer sponsored coverage. He considered the case of a "tightly targeted" tax credit for individuals earning between $15,000 and $30,000 (credit amount $6,000) and families earning between $30,000 and $60,000 (credit amount $15,000) per year. In his model, if the goal is to reduce the uninsured population by 10 million, the tax credit must encourage 13 million people to enroll, since 3 million people would lose their employer sponsored coverage. The "looser" the target of the tax credit (i.e., the higher the income of individuals who qualify for it), the larger the number of people who will lose employer sponsored coverage (Gruber, 2008).
The presence of an individual or employer insurance mandate can also interact with a subsidy in influencing the number of individuals who gain coverage through a program such as FEHBP. Lambrew and Gruber (2006/2007) modeled the effects of a combination of subsidies and mandates in terms of the number of those who are uninsured who gain health insurance. They compared the relative effects of less generous and more generous subsidies with and without an employer or individual mandate for health insurance and within the context of an available pool that is similar to FEHBP.
In this model, the less generous option expands Medicaid to all adults under 100 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) and gives a tax credit to individuals up to 300 percent of the FPL for health insurance if it is purchased through the FEHBP pool. The less generous option would also allow individuals in firms with less than 50 employees to buy into the pool. In the more generous option, Medicaid would be expanded to all adults under 150 percent of FPL, and a tax credit would limit premium payments to 5 percent of income for both those buying into the pool and the family share of premiums for those with employer sponsored coverage.
With more generous subsidies and no mandate, the number of those newly insured who buy into the new pool is 5.8 million; in contrast, with the same subsidies and an individual mandate, an estimated 19 million buy into the new pool. In addition, without an individual mandate, an estimated 4.4 million people lose employer sponsored coverage (from crowd out) under a generous subsidy plan, while, under the same type of subsidy with a mandate, there is a gain in employer sponsored coverage of 8.1 million people (Lambrew and Gruber, 2006/2007).
References
Gruber J, Covering the Uninsured in the U.S., Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 13758, January 2008. As of November 3, 2008: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13758
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, The Uninsured: A Primer, Menlo Park, Calif., October 2007.
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, How Non-Group Health Coverage Varies with Income, Menlo Park, Calif., February 2008.
Lambrew J, Gruber J, "Money and Mandates: Relative Effects of Key Policy Levers in Expanding Health Insurance Coverage to All Americans," Inquiry, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2006/2007," pp. 333-344.
U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), "2008 FEHB Premiums: Non-Postal Premium Rates for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program," Washington, D.C.: not dated. As of April 8, 2009: http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/rates/2008non_postal_ffs.pdf
If expanded access to FEHBP increases insurance coverage and there is a resultant increase in demand for health services, existing capacity may be strained:
- No studies evaluate the effect of an FEHBP expansion on capacity directly; however, empirical evidence suggests that insurance coverage leads to increased utilization, which could in turn place extra demands on current capacity. Read more below
- Over time, the supply of health care resources could change to meet demand created by new patterns of utilization. Read more below
- The extent to which care provided to previously uninsured people will shift utilization from acute care to primary and preventive care is unknown.Read more below
No studies evaluate the effect of an FEHBP expansion on capacity directly; however, empirical evidence suggests that insurance coverage leads to increased utilization, which could in turn place extra demands on current capacity.
In order for open enrollment in FEHBP to affect capacity (i.e., the availability of health care resources, such as hospital beds or medical equipment), there would have to be significant subsidies available to allow the uninsured to enroll. In addition, we assume that as the uninsured obtain health insurance, they would increase their utilization of health services and might change the location of their current place of care.
If open enrollment in FEHBP expands coverage to the currently uninsured, we would expect their health care utilization to increase. In the short term, existing capacity could be strained as a result of the increased demand for services. When possible, providers could increase their productivity to meet the increased demand for services. For example, physicians could potentially provide more hours per week of patient care, make greater use of nurses or physician assistants, or create new delivery units (such as "minute clinics"). Hospitals could increase the number of staffed beds.
A number of studies demonstrate that health services utilization increases when people gain health insurance. A longitudinal study over two years of 20,848 adults between age 18 and 64 found an increase in health care expenditures between years one and two for individuals who went from being uninsured to being insured (Ward and Franks, 2007). In addition, previously uninsured individuals who have a chronic disease—such as hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, or stroke—and who enroll in Medicare at the age of 65 show higher utilization of doctor visits than previously insured adults with these conditions. There was no significant difference in utilization among patients without these conditions (McWilliams et al., 2007). In a review of the literature, Buchmueller et al. (2005) find that health insurance increases outpatient utilization by one visit per year for children, and one to two visits per year for adults. For both children and adults, insurance increases utilization of preventive care as well as inpatient care, though for children there may be some decrease in hospitalizations for ambulatory-sensitive conditions (i.e., admissions that might have been avoided with effective preventive care) (Buchmueller et al., 2005).
Capacity is a local issue, and the effects will vary depending on the current adequacy of capacity in an area and the increased demand that results from the policy change. Since rural areas face more problems related to capacity than urban areas, there may be geographic variation in the effects on capacity. In addition, because there are often other barriers than health insurance to access to health care, the provision of health insurance may not stress capacity for all populations equally.
Over time, the supply of health care resources could change to meet demand created by new patterns of utilization.
Over the longer term, the supply of health care resources could increase to meet the increased demand related to insurance coverage expansion. However, because regulation and barriers to entry affect the supply of many health care resources, significant increases in the supply of some resources would be expected to occur slowly and may not materialize at all without targeted intervention.
The extent to which care provided to previously uninsured people will shift utilization from acute care to primary and preventive care is unknown.
However, there is some literature on how insurance coverage can affect emergency department (ED) use. One study on ED use showed that insurance status does not seem to be directly related to ED use, with high ED use associated with higher numbers of insured (rather than uninsured) patients; instead, it seemed that outpatient capacity constraints increased ED use for non-emergent problems (Cunningham, 2006).
With this policy option, since the magnitude of coverage increases is not known, it is difficult to predict the option's effects on capacity. In addition, because capacity can fluctuate, it is difficult to assess how much capacity could expand with a greater demand for services.
References
Buchmueller TC, Brumback K, Kronick R, Kahn JK, "Care Utilization and Implications of Insurance Expansion: A Review of the Literature," Medical Care Research and Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, February 1, 2005, pp. 3-30.
Cunningham PJ, "What Accounts for Differences in Use Between Hospital Emergency Departments Across US Communities?" Health Affairs, Web Exclusives [Epub July 18, 2006], Vol. 25, No. 5, September/October 2006, pp. w324-w336.
McWilliams JM, Meara E, Zaslavsky AM, Ayanian JZ, "Use of Health Services by Previously Uninsured Medicare Beneficiaries," New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 357, No. 2, July 12, 2007, pp. 143-153.
Ward L, Franks P, "Changes in Health Care Expenditure Associated with Gaining or Losing Health Insurance," Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 146, No. 11, June 5, 2007, pp. 768-774.
Making FEHBP more widely available would be relatively hard to implement because it would require a new administrative structure:
- Expanding enrollment in FEHBP could utilize some existing resources but would require the establishment of new administrative structures for full implementation. Read more below
- The feasibility of an FEHBP expansion will also depend on the administration of any accompanying subsidies and/or insurance mandates. Read more below
- Evidence from the initiation of Medicare Part D suggests that substantial up-front investment was required to establish systems for enrollment and outreach but that, ultimately, a large portion of eligible beneficiaries was able to successfully enroll in Part D coverage. Read more below
Expanding enrollment in FEHBP could utilize some existing resources but would require the establishment of new administrative structures for full implementation.
While many of the administrative functions of FEHBP for federal employees are handled by their respective federal agencies, we do not know which agency would be responsible for managing the new group of enrollees.
We expect that OPM, with some additional resources, could manage contract negotiations and premium determinations for the new risk pool of enrollees. In addition, a new system would have to be established to allow enrollment, including online or telephone enrollment, determination of eligibility for subsidies (or other federal or state public programs), payment systems, and community outreach.
The feasibility of an FEHBP expansion will also depend on the administration of any accompanying subsidies and/or insurance mandates.
The bulk of the operational feasibility issues would fall on the government and health plans in terms of enrollment of new members and transfers of subsidies and premium payments. There should be limited disruption of contracting between health plans and providers for this new group of enrollees.
Evidence from the initiation of Medicare Part D suggests that substantial up-front investment was required to establish systems for enrollment and outreach but that, ultimately, a large portion of eligible beneficiaries was able to successfully enroll in Part D coverage.
Although there is no literature specifically on this issue, some conclusions can be drawn from the operational feasibility of the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit. The implementation of this program required many of the same activities as would be required for an open enrollment into FEHBP. Medicare Part D required considerable up-front federal investment. The Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act appropriated $1 billion to the Centers for Medicaid & Medicare and $500 million to the Social Security Administration for administrative start-up costs for the program (GAO, 2007; Romig, 2007)
Despite concerns about the difficulties for seniors in picking a drug plan among the multitude of choices, ultimately, most seniors were able to enroll, and surveys found that only 10 percent remained without drug coverage in 2006. Of these, approximately half were in good health and voluntarily chose not to participate in Part D. The other half were found to be "hard to reach" because of a variety of sociodemographic characteristics. This group tended to include more individuals over the age of 75, African-Americans, those with only a high school education, those under 150 percent of the federal poverty level, and those in rural areas. Researchers also found that 3.4–4.7 million Part D beneficiaries who were eligible for low income subsidies were not getting them (Neuman et al., 2007).
References
Neuman P, Strollo MK, Guterman S, Rogers WH, Li A, Roday AM, Safran DG, "Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Progress Report: Findings from a 2006 National Survey of Seniors," Health Affairs, Web Exclusives, [Epub August 21, 2007], Vol. 26, No. 5, September/October 2007, pp. w640-w643.
Romig K, "Social Security Administration: Administrative Budget Issues," CRS Report for Congress, RS22677, June 13, 2007.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services: Internal Control Deficiencies Resulted in Millions of Dollars of Questionable Contract Payments, GAO-08-54, November 15, 2007.
Analysis of Options Sub Pages
- Overview
- Individual Mandate
- Employer Mandate
- Purchasing Pools
- Refundable Tax Credit
- Medicaid/SCHIP Eligibility
- Open Access to Government Employee Program
- High Deductible Health Plans
- Hospital Pay for Performance
- Physician Pay for Performance
- Bundled Payment
- Comparative Effectiveness
- Health IT
- Disease Management
- Medical Malpractice
