Analysis of Medicaid/SCHIP Eligibility
The primary purpose of expanding eligibility for Medicaid and/or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) is to increase the number of people who are eligible for these public programs, with a particular focus on individuals who do not have access to employer-sponsored insurance and who cannot afford to purchase private insurance policies.
These are the nine performance dimensions against which we measured Medicaid/SCHIP Eligibility:
Expanding federal mandatory minimum Medicaid/SCHIP income eligibility will have no discernible effect on overall health care spending, but it will increase government spending:
- Using our model, we estimate that there will be little change in aggregate national health spending associated with a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion and that there will be small decreases in out-of-pocket spending. Read more below
- Using our model, we estimate that Medicaid/SCHIP spending will increase about $18 billion to $89 billion, and that government cost per "net newly insured" will range from $4,420 to $6,420 as income eligibility increases from 100 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) to 300 percent of FPL. Read more below
- Our estimates are consistent with the results from other researchers who have modeled the effect of Medicaid/SCHIP expansions on spending. Read more below
Using our model, we estimate that there will be little change in aggregate national health spending associated with a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion and that there will be small decreases in out-of-pocket spending.
Expanding the federal mandatory minimum income eligibility level for Medicaid/SCHIP for all individuals with qualifying income levels will have almost no effect on aggregate national health spending. This is because the increase in spending among those who move from being uninsured to enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP is offset by decreased spending by individuals who switch to Medicaid/SCHIP from group or non–group policies.
We modeled a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion with the following design:
- Medicaid and SCHIP are treated as the same program.
- Eligibility for Medicaid/SCHIP is tied solely to household income for the non-elderly. We tested a range of mandatory federal minimum income levels between 100 percent of FPL to 400 percent of FPL. (Currently, federal mandatory income eligibility levels vary by category of eligibility. The minimum required levels to obtain federal matching funds are 133 percent of FPL for pregnant women and for children 0 to 5 and 100 percent of the FPL for children 6 to 19; parents' income eligibility varies from 20 to 409 percent of FPL for working parents and 11 to 275 percent of FPL for nonworking parents. Adults without children are generally excluded from Medicaid).
- Those newly eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP are not subject to cost sharing and do not have to pay premiums.
- People who currently have group coverage are allowed to switch to Medicaid/SCHIP.
- People who currently have non-group coverage are allowed to switch to Medicaid/SCHIP.
- People with other types of insurance (e.g., TRICARE) are allowed to switch to Medicaid/SCHIP.
- There is no waiting period for eligibility.
- Firms can drop a current offer of coverage to employees, and their probability of doing so varies with the percentage of a firm's employees who become newly eligible for Medicaid.
We made the following assumptions in modeling the effect of a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion:
- States that have eligibility criteria that are more generous than those in the expansion proposal retain their current policy.
- The participation rate in Medicaid/SCHIP is the same as the status quo, and it varies by age, income, health, gender, and some other individual characteristics.
- Medicaid/SCHIP expansions are associated with a slight decrease in stigma (effectively increasing the take-up, or participation, rate 5 percent above observed rates in the status quo).
- The rate at which the group market "crowds out" the Medicaid program varies between 17 and 45 percent as the income eligibility level increases. The level of crowd out is set as a parameter that we calibrated based on the literature. We tested the sensitivity of our results to the crowd out factor selected.
- Uninsured adults newly enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP for the full year increase utilization by 62 percent; uninsured adults newly enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP for part of the year increase utilization by 42 percent.
- Uninsured children newly enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP for the full year increase utilization by 37 percent; uninsured children newly enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP for part of the year increase utilization by 20 percent.
- People who switch to Medicaid/SCHIP from group or non-group insurance reduce utilization by 20 percent.
Table 1 shows the results of our modeling on changes in spending associated with a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion at three different levels of income eligibility. We estimate that national health spending is essentially unchanged under policies that expand eligibility from 100 percent of FPL to 300 percent of FPL. Out-of-pocket spending falls slightly because new Medicaid/SCHIP enrollees will have no cost sharing.
| Category of Spending | Minimum Federal Income Eligibility Threshold | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 100% FPL | 200% FPL | 300% FPL | |
| Change in national health spending due to increased utilization ($billion) | 0.1 | ($2.9) | ($7.5) |
| Change in out-of-pocket spending ($billion) | ($2.1) | ($5.4) | ($9.3) |
SOURCE: RAND COMPARE microsimulation modeling results, December 30 2008.
NOTES: In 2008, for a family of four, FPL (100%) was $21,200. Numbers in parentheses are decreases in spending.
Using our model, we estimate that Medicaid/SCHIP spending will increase about $18 billion to $89 billion, and that government cost per "net newly insured" will range from $4,420 to $6,420 as income eligibility increases from 100 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) to 300 percent of FPL.
As shown in Table 2, the major effect of a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion is that government spending will increase $17.9 to $89.0 billion, about a 6 to 28 percent increase in program spending. In 2006, the federal share of Medicaid/SCHIP spending was 57 percent (based on statehealthfacts.org, not dated); if the same proportion applied after the change, federal spending would increase $10.2 to $50.7 billion and state spending would increase $7.7 to $38.3 billion. We estimate that the government cost for each net newly insured person would be $4,420 to $6,420, because 33 to 61 percent of new enrollees in Medicaid/SCHIP previously had another source of insurance; the government is now paying all the costs for those persons without changing their insurance status. (Net newly insured is defined as the number of people who are newly insured minus the number of people who are newly uninsured. The quantity is the absolute improvement in the number of uninsured achieved by a policy change.)
| Category of Spending | Minimum Federal Income Eligibility Threshold | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 100% FPL | 200% FPL | 300% FPL | |
| Change in Medicaid/SCHIP spending ($billion) | $17.9 | $55.5 | $89.0 |
| Government cost per the net newly insured ($) | $4,420 | $5,890 | $6,420 |
SOURCE: RAND COMPARE microsimulation modeling results, December 30, 2008.
NOTE: In 2008, for a family of four, FPL (100 percent) was $21,200.
Our estimates are consistent with the results from other researchers who have modeled the effect of Medicaid/SCHIP expansions on spending.
Gruber (2008) modeled a Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansion for all individuals under two different income eligibility levels. A program that expands Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility to all individuals under 100 percent of FPL would increase costs $26 billion (in 2006 dollars), or $5,000 per newly insured (i.e., excluding those with prior insurance). Under an income eligibility of 185 percent of FPL, the cost of the program would increase $47 billion and cost $4,700 per net newly insured. The cost per net newly insured is largely due to assumptions about the number of people who would switch from private insurance (group and non-group) to Medicaid/SCHIP relative to the number of people who would move from being uninsured to being covered under Medicaid.
| Category of Spending | Income Eligibility Threshold | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100% FPL | 125% FPL | 175% FPL | 185% FPL | 200% FPL | |
| COMPARE results | |||||
| Additional government cost ($billion) | $17.9 | $25.1 | $46.7 | $55.5 | |
| Government cost per the net newly insured | $4,420 | $4,640 | $5,825 | $5,890 | |
| Gruber results | |||||
| Additional government cost ($billion) | $26.0 | $47.0 | |||
| Government cost per the net newly insured | $5,000 | $4,700 | |||
SOURCES: RAND COMPARE microsimulation modeling, December 30, 2008; for additional government cost, Gruber, 2008, Table 3; for government cost per net newly insured at 185 percent of FPL, Gruber, 2008.
NOTE: Gruber's results are in 2006 dollars; the COMPARE results are in 2007 dollars.
Studies have examined other types of proposed Medicaid expansions and past efforts to change a variety of the current eligibility rules. Hadley and Holahan (2003) modeled an expansion in insurance coverage that would provide "average" public coverage for low and middle income currently uninsured individuals. Hadley and Holahan predicted that average spending (in 2001 dollars) would increase from $1,383 per person to $2,121 per person (a 53 percent increase) and that total spending on this population would increase from $98.9 billion to $132.8 billion (a $33.9 billion increase). They demonstrated that there is some variability in spending between part year and full year uninsured individuals. The expansion modeled by Hadley and Holahan would increase total health care spending by 3 to 6 percent and raise health care's share of the gross domestic product by less than 1 percentage point.
Ku and Broaddus (2008) simulated a policy under which the average low income uninsured child and adult obtain Medicaid/SCHIP. For adults (19 to 64 years old), spending would increase from $1,124 to $3,084 (a 174 percent increase); for children (0 to 18 years), spending would increase from $775 to $918 (an 18 percent increase) (in 2005 dollars). Their model also predicts that, because, on average, currently uninsured individuals are healthier than current Medicaid recipients, they should be less costly to cover. Whereas spending for an adult Medicaid recipient in 2005 was $5,671, spending for a currently uninsured adult who enrolls in Medicaid would be only $3,084.
Holahan et al. (2000) estimated the costs to insure children in SCHIP, with varying assumptions about barriers to enrollment (including financial barriers, such as premiums, and nonfinancial barriers, such as difficult enrollment processes) and varying income eligibility levels. Under a policy in which eligibility is expanded to 200 percent of FPL, new public expenditures would range from $2 billion to $2.3 billion (in 1998 dollars), depending on premiums and other enrollment barriers.
An increase in total spending may not be as large as expected because, under an expansion, newly eligible beneficiaries are likely to be healthier than current beneficiaries. In a study that modeled incremental health care spending related to Medicaid expansions that occurred between 1984 and 1994, Gordon and Selden (2001) found that children who enrolled after prior Medicaid expansions had lower incremental costs per enrollee than average Medicaid per capita expenditures. (Spending estimates in that study do not account for a reduction in government spending that is already being directed toward the uninsured.) The authors credit the lower incremental spending per enrollee to a population of newly eligible enrollees who are healthier and older than existing enrollees because the majority of children with substantial health problems would have already been enrolled under Medicaid's medically needy provisions.
References
Gordon LV, Selden TM, "How Much Did the Medicaid Expansions for Children Cost? An Analysis of State Medicaid Spending, 1984–1994," Medical Care Research Review, Vol. 58, No. 4, December 1, 2001, pp. 482–495.
Gruber J, "Covering the Uninsured in the U.S.," Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 13758, January 2008. As of June 5, 2009: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13758
Hadley J, Holahan J, "Covering the Uninsured: How Much Would It Cost?" Health Affairs, Web Exclusive, June 4, 2003, pp. w250–w265.
Holahan J, Uccello C, Feder J, Kim J, "Children's Health Insurance: The Difference Policy Choices Make," Inquiry, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 7–22.
Ku L, Broaddus M, "Public and Private Health Insurance: Stacking Up the Costs," Health Affairs, Web Exclusives [Epub, June 24, 2008], Vol. 27, No 4, July/August 2008, pp. w318–w327.
statehealthfacts.org, "Federal and State Share of Medicaid Spending, FY2006," Menlo Park, Calif.: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, not dated.
From our model results, we find a small reduction in consumer financial risk after a Medicaid expansion, but those newly on Medicaid/SCHIP would have substantial reductions in financial risk:
- We find a 2 to 12 percent reduction in the median proportion of income spent on health care by the non–elderly overall. Read more below
- For those newly on Medicaid/SCHIP, our model shows reductions of 51 to 64 percent in the median percentage of income spent on health care for the newly insured and even larger reductions among those previously on group insurance. Read more below
- We estimate that the proportion of people living in families who spend more than 10 percent of their income on health will decline 31 to 47 percent among those newly insured; reductions among those who were previously on group insurance are much larger. Read more below
We find a 2 to 12 percent reduction in the median proportion of income spent on health care by the non–elderly overall.
As shown in Table 1, a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion will reduce the median proportion of income spent on health care by the non–elderly from 6 to between 5.3 and 5.9 percent, depending on the new income eligibility. A reduction in the median percentage of income spent on health care of 10 percent or greater is meaningful.
| Median Percentage of Income Spent on Health Care | Minimum Federal Income Eligibility Threshold | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 100% FPL | 200% FPL | 300% FPL | |
| Before expansion | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 |
| After expansion | 5.9 | 5.5 | 5.3 |
| Percentage change | -2% | -8% | -12% |
SOURCE: RAND COMPARE microsimulation modeling results. December 30, 2008.
Table 2 shows that the proportion of non-elderly who will pay 10 percent or more of their income on health care is reduced 3 to 15 percent, a notable difference at the population level. For a family of four at 100 percent of the federal poverty level, 10 percent of income is about $2,120. This is consistent with the modeling result showing a decrease in out-of-pocket spending (see Spending results).
| Proportion in Families Spending More Than 10% on Health Care | Minimum Federal Income Eligibility Threshold | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 100% FPL | 200% FPL | 300% FPL | |
| Before expansion | 26.4 | 26.4 | 26.4 |
| After expansion | 25.6 | 23.5 | 22.4 |
| Percentage change | -3% | -11% | -15% |
SOURCE: RAND COMPARE microsimulation modeling results, December 30, 2008.
For those newly on Medicaid/SCHIP, our model shows reductions of 51 to 64 percent in the median percentage of income spent on health care for the newly insured and even larger reductions among those previously on group insurance.
In Table 3, we show that the median percentage of income spent on health care is substantially reduced under a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion, both among those who become newly insured (51 to 64 percent reduction) and among those who switch from another source of insurance (94 percent reduction). About half of the newly insured were spending considerably less on health care than the insured population (about 3 to 4 percent compared to 6 percent for the population) before the policy change, and after the policy change about half will spend just 1 to 2 percent on health care. The median percentage of income spent on health care among those who had group insurance before the policy change is higher than the median for the non-elderly population and then declines after the policy change to near zero.
| Median Percentage of Income Spent on Health Care | Minimum Federal Income Eligibility Threshold | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 100% FPL | 200% FPL | 300% FPL | |
| The newly insured | |||
| Before expansion | 3.7% | 2.8% | 2.8% |
| After expansion | 1.8% | 1.2% | 1.0% |
| Percentage change | -51% | -57% | -64% |
| Those switching from group insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP | |||
| Before expansion | 12.6% | 9.6% | 8.3% |
| After expansion | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.5% |
| Percentage change | -94% | -94% | -94% |
SOURCE: RAND COMPARE microsimulation modeling results, December 30, 2008.
We estimate that the proportion of people living in families who spend more than 10 percent of their income on health will decline 31 to 47 percent among those newly insured; reductions among those who were previously on group insurance are much larger.
In Table 4, we show that a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion will substantially reduce the proportion of people in families who spend more than 10 percent of their income on health care. Among those who are newly insured, the proportion is reduced 31 to 47 percent; this change makes the newly insured less subject overall to significant health care costs. Among those who switched from group insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP, the reduction is 95 percent. A higher proportion of people in group insurance before the policy change were spending more than 10 percent of their income on health than were the uninsured; by enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP, this group has almost no one with expenditures at this level.
| Proportion of Families Spending More Than 10% on Health Care | Minimum Federal Income Eligibility Threshold | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 100% FPL | 200% FPL | 300% FPL | |
| The newly insured | |||
| Before expansion | 29.3 | 22.7 | 21.1 |
| After expansion | 20.3 | 13.3 | 11.1 |
| Percentage change | -31% | -41% | -47% |
| Those switching from group insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP | |||
| Before expansion | 59.6 | 48.0 | 35.8 |
| After expansion | 3.2 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Percentage change | -95% | -96% | -95% |
SOURCE: RAND COMPARE microsimulation model results, December 30, 2008.
The effect of Medicaid/SCHIP expansions on waste is uncertain, because there is little direct evidence and because the theoretical relationships may have offsetting effects:
- No studies directly examine the effect of expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility on waste. Read more below
- Administrative waste could increase if a significantly greater number of eligible persons are subjected to complex requirements to obtain or maintain enrollment, and it could decrease to reflect reductions in uncompensated care. Read more below
- Clinical waste could decrease if newly eligible enrollees shift their patterns of utilization from less efficient to more efficient providers, particularly if they shift from using emergency departments for primary care to visiting physicians' offices. Read more below
- Operational waste is unlikely to be affected, because the policy change does not have a direct effect on the way the delivery system is organized. Read more below
No studies directly examine the effect of expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility on waste.
We conceptualize waste in the U.S. health care system as a measure of inefficiency and categorize it as administrative, operational, or clinical (Bentley et al., 2008). Waste can be identified at the system level and at the individual level, although substantial challenges remain in estimating the magnitude of waste.
No studies explicitly examine the effect of expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility on waste or evaluate the effect of Medicaid/SCHIP enrollment on moral hazard or the use of unnecessary or low value care. Although a considerable amount of the literature shows that increased cost sharing reduces the use of health services (Newhouse and Insurance Experiment Group, 1993; Wharam et al., 2007; Keeler et al., 1996), it can be difficult to determine whether such services were wasteful.
Some studies evaluate the effect of coverage expansions on costs of care (and, potentially, waste), focusing on the relative efficiency of the settings in which patients receive care. Several studies support the notion that the uninsured tend to get care in costly settings, such as the emergency department (ED). Walls, Rhodes, and Kennedy (2002) found that lack of insurance predicted ED use as a patient's usual source of care, whereas Begley and colleagues (2006) found that primary care related ED use was strongly associated with lack of insurance and poverty. Other studies have pointed out that, whereas the uninsured may use the ED more for primary care, their use of the ED in terms of number of visits is not greater overall than that of the insured (Hunt, 2006; Cunningham, 2006b; Weber et al., 2005; Cunningham and May, 2003). Studies also suggest that, if an uninsured person gets access to insurance, inappropriate ED use may decrease. For example, Cunningham and Hadley (2004) found that communities with higher insurance rates had lower use of hospital EDs, and Cunningham (2006a) found that a decrease in Medicaid/SCHIP enrollment would lead to an increase in ED visits by the uninsured.
Clinical waste could decrease if newly eligible enrollees shift their patterns of utilization from less efficient to more efficient providers, particularly if they shift from using emergency departments for primary care to visiting physicians' offices.
Expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility will expand coverage to the uninsured, which could decrease clinical waste by shifting some primary care services from EDs, which are inherently inefficient providers of primary care services, to outpatient settings. The degree to which waste is reduced will depend on the magnitude of such changes in patterns of service delivery. On the other hand, expanding Medicaid/SCHIP to the uninsured will increase their utilization of health services, some of which will be of low value, that are unlikely to produce any health benefit, which will increase waste. Because we found few net effects of this policy change on utilization, we would not expect to observe significant reductions in clinical waste.
Administrative waste could increase if a significantly greater number of eligible persons are subjected to complex requirements to obtain or maintain enrollment, and it could decrease to reflect reductions in uncompensated care.
This policy change may have some effect on administrative waste as well. Some portion of administrative overhead is currently used for administering otherwise uncompensated care; this portion would decrease as previously uninsured individuals move toward systems of care already in place for handling insured individuals. Although administrative overhead is not waste per se, if the policy option reduces the amount of uncompensated care provided by an institution, then waste may decrease.
Conversely, the influx of previously uninsured patients into the Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility and enrollment system could, at least in the short term, increase administrative overhead. We estimate a 6 to 26 percent increase in enrollment, and this will be much higher in those states with very low current eligibility standards. In addition, the coexistence of Medicaid and SCHIP in some states has created administrative complexity and program fragmentation, and it has led to unnecessary dropouts and switching between programs. If expanding eligibility to Medicaid/SCHIP increases such fragmentation, it could also increase waste. The size of the net effect is unknown.
Sommers (2005) analyzed dropout and switching rates in states that had separate Medicaid and SCHIP programs against those in states with combined programs. The study found that dropout rates were 45 percent higher in states with separate Medicaid and SCHIP programs, and states that changed from combined programs to separate programs—Maryland and South Dakota—experienced statistically significant increases in dropout rates.
Operational waste is unlikely to be affected, because the policy change does not have a direct effect on the way the delivery system is organized.
Operational waste refers to the efficiency with which services are delivered within organizations. We do not expect that this policy change will directly affect the way organizations operate.
References
Begley CE, Vojvodic RW, Seo M, Burau K, "Emergency Use and Access to Primary Care: Evidence from Houston, Texas," Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved, Vol. 17, No. 3, August 2006, pp. 610–624.
Bentley TGK, Effros RM, Palar K, Keeler EB, "Waste in the U.S. Health Care System: A Conceptual Framework," Milbank Quarterly [Epub November, 21 2008], Vol. 86, No. 4, December 2008, pp. 629–659.
Cunningham PJ, "Medicaid/SCHIP Cuts and Hospital Emergency Department Use," Health Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1, January/February 2006a, pp. 237–247.
Cunningham PJ, "What Accounts for Differences in the Use of Hospital Emergency Departments Across U.S. Communities?" Health Affairs, Web Exclusives [Epub July 18, 2006], Vol. 25, No. 5, September/October 2006b, pp. w324–w336.
Cunningham P, Hadley J, "Expanding Care Versus Expanding Coverage: How to Improve Access to Care," Health Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, July/August 2004, pp. 234–244.
Cunningham PJ, May JH, Insured Americans Drive Surge in Emergency Department Visits, Washington, D.C.: Center for Studying Health Systems Change, Issue Brief No. 70, October 2003, pp. 1–6.
Hunt KA, "Characteristics of Frequent Users of Emergency Departments," Annals of Emergency Medicine [Epub March 30, 2006], Vol. 48, No. 1, July 2006, pp. 1–8.
Keeler EB, Malkin JD, Goldman DP, Buchanan JL, "Can Medical Savings Accounts for the Nonelderly Reduce Health Care Costs?" Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 275, No. 21, June 5, 1996, pp. 1666–1671.
Newhouse JP, Insurance Experiment Group, Free for All? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.
Sommers BD, "The Impact of Program Structure on Children's Disenrollment from Medicaid and SCHIP," Health Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 6, November/December 2005, pp. 1611–1618.
Walls CA, Rhodes KV, Kennedy JJ, "The Emergency Department as Usual Source of Medical Care: Estimates from the 1998 National Health Interview Survey," Academic Emergency Medicine, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 2002, pp. 1140–1145.
Weber EJ, Showstack JA, Hunt KA, Colby DC, Callaham ML, "Does Lack of a Usual Source of Care or Health Insurance Increase the Likelihood of an Emergency Department Visit? Results of a National Population–Based Study," Annals of Emergency Medicine [Epub October 24, 2004], Vol. 45, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 4–12.
Wharam JF, Landon BE, Galbraith AA, Kleinman KP, Soumerai SB, Ross–Degnan D, "Emergency Department Use and Subsequent Hospitalizations Among Members of a High–Deductible Health Plan," Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 297, No. 10, March 14, 2007, pp. 1093–1102.
Expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility is unlikely to affect the reliability of care:
- No studies directly examine changes in the reliability of care when individuals enroll in Medicaid or SCHIP. Read more below
- Multiple studies suggest that the reliability of care does not vary significantly with insurance status; when uninsured individuals have access to health services, the reliability of these services is the same for both the insured and the uninsured. Read more below
No studies directly examine changes in the reliability of care when individuals enroll in Medicaid or SCHIP.
Reliability refers to the consistency with which the health care system delivers evidence based care to everyone in the population. A reliable health care entity is one that provides the right care, to the right patient, at the right time, every time. Increasing the number of individuals with coverage by expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility would not be expected to directly affect the reliability of the health care system as a whole. That is, the likelihood of the health care system delivering reliable care would not be expected to change simply because people gain coverage.
No studies have examined the relationship between expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility and reliability of care. However, there is some literature on the relationship between the type of insurance coverage people have and the reliability of care they receive.
Multiple studies suggest that the reliability of care does not vary significantly with insurance status; when uninsured individuals have access to health services, the reliability of these services is the same for both the insured and the uninsured.
Uninsured people have less access to health services than insured people, they receive lower levels of care, and they are more likely to seek nonurgent care in the emergency department. In theory, reliability could improve for these patients when they gain coverage if they receive care in a primary care setting in which they can receive regular screening, earlier diagnosis, and timely treatment. However, there are significant deficiencies in the reliability of care throughout the health care system, and the evidence thus far does not show differences in reliability of care between the insured and the uninsured. Most evidence shows that, once the uninsured are receiving services, the reliability of their care is similar to the level experienced by insured people. In fact, the gap between actual and optimal overall reliability for all people is much larger than the gap between reliability for the uninsured and that for the insured.
The available evidence does not show a strong link between insurance coverage and reliability. RAND studies (McGlynn et al., 2003; Asch et al., 2006) have provided the most comprehensive assessment of the reliability of the health care delivery system and have found few differences in the reliability of care for the uninsured versus the insured. There were no large differences, even when looking at specific types of care (acute, chronic, and preventive) or functions of care (screening, diagnosis, treatment, and follow-up). A limitation of these studies is that everyone in the study population had at least one contact with the health care system in two years, which may not reflect the experience of individuals who receive no care at all.
Several other studies also found no differences in reliability between insured and uninsured people. Leape and colleagues (1999) found no overall differences in underuse of coronary revascularization between uninsured and insured people. Young and colleagues (2001) found that "insurance and income had no effect on receipt of appropriate care for depressive and anxiety disorders." Harman, Edlund, and Fortney (2004) reported disparities in initiation of depression treatment between the uninsured and the insured, but no differences in quality of care once treatment was initiated. Of note, these studies do not necessarily examine the overuse of care, which might result from the uninsured receiving duplicate or discontinuous services at multiple locations.
On the other hand, some studies using data from surveys on self-reported health and health care use have found differences in quality measures between uninsured and insured populations. Ayanian et al. (2000) evaluated results from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) and found that uninsured adults were less likely to have had cancer screening, diabetes care, or cardiovascular risk factor reduction and were less likely to have had a routine checkup in the preceding two years. Ross, Bradley, and Busch (2006) used the BRFSS survey to compare preventive service use between high and low income uninsured individuals. For both groups, rates of cancer screening, diabetes management, and cardiovascular risk reduction were lower than those for insured patients. Busch and Duchovny (2005) examined changes in access to and quality of care that resulted from Medicaid expansions in the 1990s. These expansions allowed the enrollment of low income parents at higher income levels. The study found that, among previously uninsured mothers who had not been receiving cancer screening, 29 percent received screening following enrollment into the program. These studies may be limited in that they rely on self-reports of care received.
Although we do not expect any system-level changes in delivery that would contribute to significant improvements in reliability as a result of Medicaid expansions, some changes may be observed for individuals who become newly covered. We know relatively little about how the patterns of quality change among people who move from being uninsured to being covered by Medicaid/SCHIP, and this policy option results in a large proportion of people switching from other sources of insurance to Medicaid.
References
Asch SM, Kerr EA, Keesey J, Adams JL, Setodji CM, Malik S, McGlynn EA, "Who Is at Greatest Risk for Receiving Poor–Quality Health Care?" New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 354, No. 11, March 16, 2006, pp. 1147–1156.
Ayanian JZ, Weissman JS, Schneider EC, Ginsburg JA, Zaslavsky AM, "Unmet Health Needs of Uninsured Adults in the United States," Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 284, October 25, 2000, pp. 2061–2069.
Busch SH, Duchovny N, "Family Coverage Expansions: Impact on Insurance Coverage and Health Care Utilization of Parents," Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 24, No. 5, September 2005, pp. 876–890.
Harman JS, Edlund MJ, Fortney JC, "Disparities in the Adequacy of Depression Treatment in the United States," Psychiatric Services, Vol. 55, No. 12, December 2004, pp. 1379–1385.
Leape LL, Hilborne LH, Bell R, Kamberg C, Brook RH, "Underuse of Cardiac Procedures: Do Women, Ethnic Minorities, and the Uninsured Fail to Receive Needed Revascularization?" Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 130, No. 3, February 2, 1999, pp. 183–192.
McGlynn EA, Asch SM, Adams J, Keesey J, Hicks J, DeCristofaro A, Kerr EA, "The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States," New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 348, No. 26, June 26, 2003, pp. 2635–2645.
Ross JS, Bradley EH, Busch SH, "Use of Health Care Services by Lower–Income and Higher–Income Uninsured Adults," Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 295, No. 17, May 3, 2006, pp. 2027–2036.
Young S, Klap R, Sherbourne CD, Wells KB, "The Quality of Care for Depressive and Anxiety Disorders in the United States," Archives of General Psychiatry, Vol. 58, No. 1, January 2001, pp. 55–61.
Expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility will have an uncertain effect on patient experience for new enrollees:
- Multiple studies confirm that patient experience of care improves with enrollment in Medicaid/SCHIP, but this may not be true for people switching from group or non-group insurance. Read more below
- Enrollment in Medicaid/SCHIP seems to increase access to a regular source of health care, and it improves satisfaction with care among those who were previously uninsured. Read more below
Multiple studies confirm that patient experience of care improves with enrollment in Medicaid/SCHIP, but this may not be true for people switching from group or non-group insurance.
Lack of health insurance represents a significant barrier to access to health care. Uninsured individuals are more likely to avoid or delay seeking care, have no regular source of care, and have limited or inconvenient access to qualified providers. Expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility should significantly improve patient experience, especially for the most vulnerable populations (which include children; the elderly; individuals with chronic conditions, functional disabilities, or severe illnesses; and minorities). Evidence has shown that new beneficiaries' satisfaction ratings of their experience with the health care system after enrollment in SCHIP or Medicaid improves, as does their access to providers and services (Duderstadt et al, 2006; Kempe et al., 2005; Holl et al., 2000; Szilagyi et al., 2000).
Access barriers beyond health insurance, however, may limit improvements in patient experience, even when patients become insured; for example, many providers limit the number of Medicaid patients in their practice, so newly enrolled patients may have significant difficulties finding a provider.
Improvements in patient experience that result from expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility may be larger for patients with more health care needs or for vulnerable populations. However, disparities in care based on racial or ethnic group, geographic area, and health exist, even among insured individuals; such disparities will likely persist with an expansion in Medicaid/SCHIP.
The available literature focuses on people who were previously uninsured and then enroll in Medicaid. Because a Medicaid expansion at higher income eligibility levels causes some people to switch from group or non-group insurance to Medicaid, these people might in fact have worse patient experiences after the change because in many areas there are fewer physicians that accept Medicaid patients.
Enrollment in Medicaid/SCHIP seems to increase access to a regular source of health care, and it improves satisfaction with care among those who were previously uninsured.
Multiple studies confirm that lack of insurance is associated with more negative experiences of care. Schoen and DesRoches (2000) compared the experience of the continuously insured population to that of the uninsured and discontinuously insured; currently insured individuals with a recent period without insurance and uninsured individuals were at higher risk of going without needed care and of having problems paying medical bills, and they rated care more negatively than those with continuous insurance. Schoen et al. (1997) compared low income uninsured adults with low income adults with public or private coverage and found that the uninsured were less likely to have a regular provider and rated care more negatively than those with insurance. Zuvekas and Taliaferro (2003) and Schoen et al. (2004) have associated coverage with access to care. Newacheck, Hughes, and Stoddard (1996) found that uninsured children are twice as likely to lack a usual source of care and twice as likely to wait 60 minutes or more for a health care visit than are insured children.
Studies of SCHIP in Colorado, New York, Kansas, and Florida all show that enrollment in SCHIP led to an increase in the likelihood of having a usual source of care, and most found that access for acute care improved as well (Duderstadt et al, 2006; Kempe et al., 2005; Holl et al., 2000; Szilagyi et al., 2000).
Several studies have also shown that access to care and satisfaction with care improved most significantly for children who had been insured for more than one year and for those with special health care needs (Dick et al., 2004; Davidoff, Kenney, Dubay, 2005). A study of the effect of the Oregon Health Plan, a Medicaid waiver program, on the satisfaction of adults found that enrollees were much more likely to rate their ability to see a doctor as "excellent" or "good" than were low income privately insured and uninsured adults (Mitchell et al., 2002). They were also more likely to rate their health plan coverage as being "excellent" or "very good" and were more likely to be very satisfied with their overall quality of care.
Many unknowns remain concerning the effect of increasing Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility on patient experience. We do not know to what extent access barriers to care that are not insurance related will influence the patient experience of new enrollees. Nor do we know whether there may be more significant limitations in capacity that would affect the patient experience of new Medicaid/SCHIP enrollees. We also do not know how other changes within Medicaid/SCHIP in response to increases in enrollment could affect patient experience. For example, programs facing large influxes of new enrollees could reduce the scope of services of the program or increase cost sharing.
At higher levels of income eligibility for Medicaid, a major effect of the policy change is that people switch from private insurance (group and non-group) to Medicaid. For these individuals, their access to care may in fact decline because physicians they had previously seen refuse to accept Medicaid patients. This group represents 50 to 60 percent of the new Medicaid enrollees for the expansions to 200 percent and 300 percent of FPL.
References
Davidoff A, Kenney G, Dubay L, "Effects of the State Children's Health Insurance Program Expansions on Children with Chronic Health Conditions," Pediatrics, Vol. 116, No. 1, July 2005, pp. e34–e42.
Dick AW, Brach C, Allison RA, Shenkman E, Shone LP, Szilagyi PG, Klein JD, Lewit EM, "SCHIP's Impact in Three States: How Do the Most Vulnerable Children Fare?" Health Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 5, September/October 2004, pp. 63–75.
Duderstadt KG, Hughes DC, Soobader M-J, Newacheck PW, "The Impact of Public Insurance Expansions on Children's Access and Use of Care," Pediatrics, Vol. 118, No. 4, October 2006, pp. 1676–1682.
Holl JL, Szilagyi PG, Rodewald LE, Shone LP, Zwanziger J, Mukamel DB, Trafton S, Dick AW, Barth R, Raubertas RF, "Evaluation of New York State's Child Health Plus: Access, Utilization, Quality of Care, and Health Status," Pediatrics, Vol. 105, No. 3, Suppl., March 2000, pp. 711–718.
Kempe A, Beaty BL, Crane LA, Stokstad J, Barrow J, Belman S, Steiner JF, "Changes in Access, Utilization, and Quality of Care After Enrollment into a State Child Health Insurance Plan," Pediatrics, Vol. 115, No. 2, February 1, 2005, pp. 364–371.
Mitchell JB, Haber SG, Khatutsky G, Donoghue S, "Impact of the Oregon Health Plan on Access and Satisfaction of Adults with Low Income," Health Services Research, Vol. 37, No. 1, February 2002, pp. 19–39.
Newacheck PW, Hughes DC, Stoddard JJ, "Children's Access to Primary Care: Difference by Race, Income and Insurance Status," Pediatrics, Vol. 97, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 26–32.
Schoen C, DesRoches C, "Uninsured and Unstably Insured: The Importance of Continuous Coverage," Health Services Research, Vol. 35, No. 1, part 2, April 2000, pp. 187–206.
Schoen C, Lyons B, Rowland D, Davis K, Puleo E, "Insurance Matters for Low-Income Adults: Results from a Five-State Survey," Health Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 5, September/October 1997, pp. 163–171.
Schoen C, Osborn R, Huynh PT, Doty M, Davis K, Zapert K, Peugh J, "Primary Care and Health System Performance: Adults' Experiences in Five Countries," Health Affairs, Web Exclusive, October 28, 2004, pp. w4–487–w4–503
Szilagyi PG, Zwanziger J, Rodewald LE, Holl JL, Mukamel DB, Trafton S, Shone LP, Dick AW, Jarrell L, Raubertas RF, "Evaluation of a State Health Insurance Program for Low-Income Children: Implications for State Child Health Insurance Programs," Pediatrics, Vol. 105, No. 2, February 2000, pp. 363–371.
Zuvekas SH, Taliaferro GS, "Pathways to Access: Health Insurance, the Health Care Delivery System, and Racial/Ethnic Disparities, 1996–1999," Health Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2, March/April 2003, pp. 139–153.
From our model, we estimate a small increase in life years associated with a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion:
- We estimate that a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion would result in 410,000 to 1.55 million additional life years. Read more below
- Theory and published studies suggest that, if expanding Medicaid/SCHIP increases rates of coverage, the health of some groups should improve. Read more below
- The magnitude of the effect on health may depend on the health of the individual when he or she gains insurance and other socioeconomic factors, as well as on changes in access afforded by health insurance and the reliability of care received. Read more below
We estimate that a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion would result in 410,000 to 1.55 million additional life years.
In our analysis, we used projections from the RAND Future Elderly Model to determine the increase in life expectancy attributable to a change in insurance status (Goldman et al., 2004). We assumed that individuals who obtain coverage under this policy option would retain that coverage continuously until they become eligible for Medicare at age 65. We further assumed that those who obtain insurance change from the expected mortality rate observed for the uninsured to the expected mortality rate observed for the insured. We observed no difference in mortality among the population over age 65 based on their insurance status prior to becoming eligible for Medicare; therefore, we assumed that all of the effect of becoming newly insured occurs between becoming insured and age 65, a mortality difference of 9.06 percent. We assumed that there are no changes in rates of treatment or in the effectiveness with which medical care is delivered as a result of this policy change.
In the table, we show the expected gain in years of life for all Americans under a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion that affects individuals with incomes below 100, 200, and 300 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL). Depending on the new threshold for Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility, total years of life gained could range from 410,000 to 1.55 million.
| Change in Life Years Attributable to Medicaid/SCHIP Expansion | Minimum Federal Income Eligibility Threshold | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 100% FPL | 200% FPL | 300% FPL | |
| Millions of life years | 0.41 | 1.03 | 1.55 |
SOURCE: RAND COMPARE modification of RAND Future Elderly Model results (Goldman et al., 2004), December 30, 2008.
Theory and published studies suggest that, if expanding Medicaid/SCHIP increases rates of coverage, the health of some groups should improve.
Acquiring health insurance coverage should improve access to medical care and result in improved health. The literature suggests that there may be a modest relationship between insurance status and health outcomes, but methodological issues have made it difficult to make a precise estimate. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment randomly assigned families into health plans, providing an opportunity to assess how benefit generosity affected health outcomes in a setting in which health was unrelated to insurance choice (Newhouse and Insurance Experiment Group, 1993). Overall, the study found that benefit generosity had a negligible influence on health outcomes for the general population, although there were some benefits for low income participants. However, since everyone in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment had at least minimal health coverage, its results cannot necessarily be used to gauge the effect of becoming insured.
Levy and Meltzer (2008) reviewed the literature on the relationship between health insurance and health and drew several conclusions. First, they found that most studies are not able to establish a causal relationship between health insurance and health because the studies do not account for the multiple other factors that affect these two variables or the fact that health itself affects insurance status. Second, they found substantial evidence that health insurance improves health in vulnerable populations, such as infants, children, individuals with HIV, and some low income adults, but there is less evidence of this relationship for other groups. Finally, they suggest that it may be difficult to generalize the results of the studies thus far.
Hadley (2003) reviewed the literature from the past 25 years on this subject and found general consensus among studies that providing the uninsured with health insurance would result in improved health. Hadley's "best guess" on the size of the effect was a 4 to 25 percent reduction in mortality for previously uninsured people. Our estimate (discussed above) is contained in this range. Although Hadley cites substantial methodological difficulties within these studies, he acknowledges the substantial consistency in the findings: improved health with insurance in many populations and disease states.
The magnitude of the effect on health may depend on the health of the individual when he or she gains insurance and other socioeconomic factors, as well as on changes in access afforded by health insurance and the reliability of care received.
Over the longer term, it is possible that Medicaid/SCHIP expansions will improve health; however, studies from previous insurance expansions show mixed results on the effects of health. Some subgroups of children show improvements in health when they enroll in Medicaid, but the results are not consistent across all populations (Holl et al., 2000; Lykens and Jargowsky, 2002; Stevens, Seid, and Halfon, 2006). Note that Child Health Plus (CHPlus) was a child health insurance program implemented in New York State in 1991 to provide health insurance to children age 13 or under. CHPlus later became a model for the nationwide SCHIP. Studies of Medicaid expansions to pregnant women also seem to suggest improved infant mortality rates (Currie and Grogger, 2002).
Because medical care represents only one of the many determinants of health (others include behavior, socioeconomic status, education, and genetics), improved access to medical care via insurance changes may have only a modest effect on health. McGinnis, Williams-Russo, and Knickman (2002) suggest that only 10 percent of preventable deaths may be due to problems with medical care.
Estimating the effect of insurance on health poses significant methodological challenges. In particular, insurance status and health are not independent; that is, health can directly affect the ability or desire to obtain coverage. Healthy people may be less likely to enroll in insurance because they anticipate having minimal health expenditures. On the other hand, sick individuals may be unable to purchase individual policies; however, when these individuals become sick enough, they may qualify for a government sponsored program, such as Medicaid/SCHIP. Other unobservable characteristics may also influence both health and insurance status. Thus, when researchers attempt to study differences in health based on health insurance status, it can be difficult to discern whether the provision of insurance really causes improved health.
References
Currie J, Grogger J, "Medicaid Expansions and Welfare Contractions: Offsetting Effects on Prenatal Care and Infant Health?" Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2, March 2002, pp. 313–335.
Goldman DP, Shekelle PG, Bhattacharya J, Hurd MD, Joyce GF, Lakdawalla DN, Matsui DH, Newberry SJ, Panis CWA, Shang B, Health Status and Medical Treatment of the Future Elderly: Final Report, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR—169—CMS, 2004. As of June 11, 2009: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR169/
Hadley J, "Sicker and Poorer—The Consequences of Being Uninsured: A Review of the Research on the Relationship Between Health Insurance, Medical Care Use, Health, Work, and Income," Medical Care Research and Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, Suppl., June 1, 2003, pp. 3S–75S.
Holl JL, Szilagyi PG, Rodewald LE, Shone LP, Zwanziger J, Mukamel DB, Trafton S, Dick AW, Barth R, Raubertas RF, "Evaluation of New York State's Child Health Plus: Access, Utilization, Quality of Care, and Health Status," Pediatrics, Vol. 105, No. 3, Suppl., March 2000, pp. 711–718.
Levy H, Meltzer D, "The Impact of Health Insurance on Health," Annual Review of Public Health, Vol. 29, April 2008, pp. 399–409.
Lykens KA, Jargowsky PA, "Medicaid Matters: Children's Health and Medicaid Eligibility Expansions," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 21, No. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 219–238.
McGinnis JM, Williams-Russo P, Knickman JR, "The Case for More Active Policy Attention to Health Promotion," Health Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2, March/April 2002, pp. 78–93.
Newhouse JP, and Insurance Experiment Group, Free for All? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.
From our model and other studies, we estimate that coverage will increase 6 to 26 percent:
- About 6 to 35 million people will newly enroll in Medicaid, but just 3 to 12 million of them were previously uninsured. Read more below
- Crowd out of private insurance, whereby individuals switch from group or other coverage to Medicaid/SCHIP, may account for 30 to 60 percent of new Medicaid/SCHIP enrollees under this proposal. Read more below
About 6 to 35 million people will newly enroll in Medicaid, but just 3 to 12 million of them were previously uninsured.
Expanding the mandatory minimum income eligibility level for Medicaid/SCHIP for all individuals with qualifying income levels will increase the total number of new enrollees in Medicaid/SCHIP by 10 to 57 percent (about 6 to 35 million people). Of the new enrollees, 3 to 12 million were previously uninsured, resulting in a 6 to 26 percent reduction in the number of uninsured.
We modeled a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion with the following design:
- Medicaid and SCHIP are treated as the same program.
- Eligibility for Medicaid/SCHIP is tied solely to household income for the non-elderly. We tested a range of mandatory federal minimum income levels between 100 percent of FPL to 400 percent of FPL (regarding current federal mandatory income eligibility levels, see the section on spending above).
- Those newly eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP are not subject to cost sharing and do not pay premiums.
- People who currently have group coverage are allowed to switch to Medicaid/SCHIP.
- People who currently have non-group coverage are allowed to switch to Medicaid/SCHIP.
- People with other insurance (e.g., TRICARE) are allowed to switch to Medicaid/SCHIP.
- There are no waiting periods for eligibility.
- Firms can drop a current offer of coverage to employees, and their probability of doing so varies with the percentage of a firm's employees who become newly eligible for Medicaid.
We made the following assumptions in modeling the effect of a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion:
- States that have eligibility criteria more generous than those in the expansion proposal retain their current policy.
- The participation rate in Medicaid/SCHIP is the same as the status quo, and it varies by age, income, health, gender, and some other individual characteristics.
- Medicaid/SCHIP expansions are associated with a slight decrease in stigma (effectively increasing the take-up, or participation, rate 5 percent above observed rates in the status quo).
- The rate at which the group market crowds out the Medicaid program varies between 17 and 45 percent as the income eligibility level increases. The level of crowd out is set as a parameter that we calibrated based on the literature. We tested the sensitivity of our results to the crowd out factor selected.
- Full year uninsured adults newly enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP increase utilization by 62 percent; part year uninsured adults newly enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP increase utilization by 42 percent.
- Full year uninsured children newly enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP increase utilization by 37 percent; part year uninsured children newly enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP increase utilization by 20 percent.
- People who switch to Medicaid/SCHIP from group or non-group insurance reduce utilization by 20 percent.
A Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansion would lead to an increase in coverage, since a higher share of the population would be eligible for subsidized benefits. The expansion of Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility would have a greater effect on those low income populations that are not currently eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP, particularly adults without children. However, for a variety of reasons, not all eligible individuals will choose to enroll in the program. Some individuals and families who are newly eligible may opt not to enroll because they are already covered through the employer or non-group market or because of administrative barriers associated with enrollment. For some people, a stigma is associated with enrollment in a public program.
We modeled the effects of expanding the eligibility levels for Medicaid/SCHIP on the rates of coverage. Table 1 shows the estimated effect on coverage under a health care policy change wherein Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility is expanded to all individuals and families below 100 percent, 200 percent, and 300 percent of FPL. The magnitude of the effect depends on the income threshold for eligibility. If eligibility is limited to people living below 100 percent of FPL, then approximately 4.1 million people who were previously uninsured (6 percent of the total uninsured) would gain coverage. Expanding eligibility to everyone living below 300 percent of FPL could extend Medicaid/SCHIP to 15.1 million previously uninsured individuals. However, because some employers are expected to drop coverage for employees once they find their employees are newly eligible for Medicaid, approximately 1.2 million will become newly uninsured, resulting in a net reduction in current uninsurance rates of about 30 percent.
| Coverage Changes (in millions) | Minimum Federal Income Eligibility Threshold | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 100% FPL | 200% FPL | 300% FPL | |
| The newly insured | 4.1 | 10.2 | 15.1 |
| The newly uninsured | 0 | 0.8 | 1.2 |
| The net newly insured | 4.1 | 9.4 | 13.9 |
| Those newly on Medicaid/SCHIP | 6.1 | 20.0 | 35.2 |
| Switch from group insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP | 1.0 | 6.7 | 15.3 |
| Switch from non-group insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP | 0.7 | 2.0 | 3.5 |
| Switch from other insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP | 0.3 | 1.1 | 1.3 |
SOURCE: COMPARE microsimulation model results, December 30, 2008.
NOTE: The net newly insured are the newly insured minus the net newly uninsured.
Table 1 also shows that as the income eligibility threshold rises, more people who previously had private coverage through the group and non-group market would switch to Medicaid/SCHIP, because doing so would reduce out-of-pocket spending.
Crowd out of private insurance, whereby individuals switch from group or other coverage to Medicaid/SCHIP, may account for 30 to 60 percent of new Medicaid/SCHIP enrollees under this proposal.
Although efforts to expand Medicaid/SCHIP income eligibility are designed to expand coverage for the uninsured, a significant number of new enrollees may actually have prior coverage. Some individuals with prior private coverage will drop this coverage and enroll in Medicaid/SCHIP if they meet the eligibility requirements. The cost sharing of these programs is significantly lower than in most private plans, so some individuals will choose to drop their private coverage in favor of these public programs. Employers may also decide to stop offering health insurance to their employees because of increased employee eligibility for Medicaid/SCHIP.
We tested the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the crowd out parameter, which resulted in a crowd out rate of 9.6 to 57 percent, consistent with the full range identified from the literature. Not surprisingly, the number of people newly enrolling in Medicaid is sensitive to this decision, particularly for expansions to 200 and 300 percent of FPL. The results presented here use a narrower range (17 to 45 percent), which results in 6 to 35 million people newly enrolling in Medicaid. The expanded range of crowd out rates produces estimates of the increase in the number of people newly enrolling in Medicaid of 6 to 47 million.
Gruber and Simon (2007) modeled the effects of crowd out on private coverage by public programs and found that, for eligibility expansions, the number of enrollees who had prior coverage is approximately 60 percent of the new enrollees in the program. This is at the higher end of our modeling results, which show that 33 to 61 percent of new enrollees previously had insurance.
In an effort to limit enrollment in the face of financial strains and to reduce crowd out of private coverage, states may require that enrollees frequently prove their eligibility, making it more likely that individuals will drop out of the program (Fairbrother et al., 2004). Many states use waiting periods, during which the individual must be uninsured, before they allow enrollment, or they may impose cost sharing to discourage people from dropping their other coverage (Davidson, Blewett, and Call, 2004). Application processes can be complex, and people may not know they are eligible for the program (Haley and Kenney, 2007). Bansak and Raphael (2007) evaluated design features of SCHIP programs that affect take–up, or participation, rates; they found that eliminating asset tests, offering continuous coverage, simplifying the application and enrollment processes, and extending benefits to parents all had positive effects on take–up rates, whereas mandatory waiting periods reduced take–up rates. They also estimate that one–third to one–quarter of children who enroll formerly had private coverage.
Gruber (2008) modeled the effect of a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion under two different eligibility scenarios and demonstrated that crowd out gets worse with higher income eligibility levels. In Table 2, we show a comparison between our model results and those produced by Gruber. Overall, the findings are similar.
| Coverage Changes | Income Eligibility Threshold | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100% FPL | 125% FPL | 175% FPL | 185% FPL | 200% FPL | |
| COMPARE results | |||||
| The newly insured (millions) | 4.1 | 5.4 | 8.5 | 10.2 | |
| Those newly on Medicaid/SCHIP (millions) | 6.1 | 9.1 | 16.2 | 20.0 | |
| The newly uninsured (millions) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 | |
| The net newly insured (millions) | 4.1 | 5.4 | 8.0 | 9.4 | |
| Switch from group insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP (millions) | 1.0 | 2.2 | 5.2 | 6.7 | |
| Switch from non-group insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP (millions) | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 2.0 | |
| Group insurance crowd out (%) | 17.0 | 23.6 | 32.1 | 33.7 | |
| Gruber results | |||||
| The newly insured (millions) | 5.0 | 11.0 | |||
| Those newly on Medicaid/SCHIP (millions) | 6.0 | 14.0 | |||
| The newly uninsured (millions) | 0.0 | 1.0 | |||
| The net newly insured (millions) | 5.0 | 10.0 | |||
| Switch from group insurance to Medicaid (millions) | 1.0 | 3.0 | |||
| Switch from non-group insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP (millions) | 1.0 | 1.0 | |||
| Group insurance crowd out (%) | 16.7 | 21.4 | |||
SOURCES: RAND COMPARE microsimulation modeling estimates, December 30, 2008; Gruber, 2008, Table 3.
NOTE:Gruber's results are in 2005 dollars; the COMPARE results are in 2007 dollars.
References
Bansak C, Raphael S, "The Effects of State Policy Design Features on Take–Up and Crowd–Out Rates for the State Children's Health Insurance Program," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, [Epub November 29, 2006], Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2007, pp. 149–175.
Davidson G, Blewett LA, Call KT, Public Program Crowd-Out of Private Coverage: What Are the Issues? Princeton, N.J.: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Research Synthesis Report No. 5, June 2004.
Fairbrother D, Dutton MJ, Bachrach D, Newell K-A, Boozang P, Cooper R, "Costs of Enrolling Children in Medicaid and SCHIP," Health Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1, January/February 2004, pp. 237–243.
Gruber J, "Covering the Uninsured in the U.S.," Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 13758, January 2008. As of June 12, 2009: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13758
Gruber J, Simon K, "Crowd-Out Ten Years Later: Have Recent Public Insurance Expansions Crowded Out Private Health Insurance?" Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 12858, January 2007. As of June 12, 2009: http://www.nber.org/papers/w12858
Haley J, Kenney G, "Low–Income Uninsured Children with Special Health Care Needs: Why Aren't They Enrolled in Public Health Insurance Programs?" Pediatrics, Vol. 119, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 60–68.
Expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility will not have a direct effect on capacity:
- Given our model results, we do not estimate increased utilization of services and thus do not expect that expanding the eligibility of Medicaid/SCHIP will directly affect the capacity of the health care system. Read more below
- Prior studies consistently show that utilization of health care services increases when people gain insurance coverage; the health of new enrollees will affect the level of demand. Read more below
Given our model results, we do not estimate increased utilization of services and thus do not expect that expanding the eligibility of Medicaid/SCHIP will directly affect the capacity of the health care system.
Capacity refers to the human resources (personnel and their productivity) and capital (medical equipment, hospitals, etc.) of the health care system. There is no evidence that expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility will change the capacity of the U.S. health care system. In theory, there is no direct connection between the capacity of the health system and the change in the number of persons becoming covered under a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion. Our model estimates project a 6 to 30 percent increase in the net number of newly insured, from about 4 to 14 million, depending on the new minimum level of eligibility; however, even at the highest level, the increased demand is likely to be small. Our model also estimates that spending will likely not change in the aggregate, suggesting that there will not be an increased demand for services. We estimate that 33 to 61 percent of those newly enrolling in Medicaid/SCHIP who previously had other insurance will actually decrease their use of health services.
Prior studies consistently show that utilization of health care services increases when people gain insurance coverage; the health of new enrollees will affect the level of demand.
Many studies have shown that uninsured people use fewer health care services than insured people, and that changes in insurance coverage are associated with changes in health care utilization. This finding would suggest that capacity may be affected in some areas as coverage levels increase. Buchmueller and colleagues' (2005) review of relevant studies found consensus that expanding health insurance coverage would increase utilization among the newly insured population.
Several studies of SCHIP in various states show that use of primary and specialty care increases with enrollment in the program. Holl et al. (2000) and Szilagyi et al. (2000) suggest that the increase in utilization is due at some level to previously unmet need, but the extent of utilization post-enrollment that is medically necessary is unknown. Results from Banthin and Selden's (2003) simulation of individuals who would have been eligible for Medicaid before and after its implementation showed that Medicaid has a statistically significant effect on the utilization of physician visits: Between 1987 and 1996, the proportion of Medicaid eligible children who had a physician visit increased from 57 percent to 64 percent. The study did not find any statistically significant changes in the proportion of Medicaid eligible children who visited the dentist or the emergency department.
Studies of Medicaid/SCHIP expansions show that these programs also increase health care utilization among adults. In a study examining the effects of a public coverage expansion in Tennessee, researchers found that enrolled adults used a greater number of most of the measured health services than did the uninsured, including preventive services (Moreno and Hoag, 2001). A study of adults enrolled in the Oregon Health Plan, a Medicaid waiver program, found that enrollment increased the use of preventive services, including Pap smears and blood pressure checks, compared with matched low income insured and uninsured individuals. Enrollees were also more likely to have had a physician's visit, a visit with a specialist, a dental visit, an emergency department visit, and a hospitalization (Mitchell et al., 2002).
An increase in utilization may not be as large as expected under a Medicaid/SCHIP expansion, because newly eligible beneficiaries are likely to be healthier than current beneficiaries. In a study that modeled incremental health care spending related to Medicaid expansions that occurred between 1984 and 1994, Gordon and Selden (2001) found that children who enrolled in past Medicaid expansions had lower incremental costs per enrollee compared with average Medicaid per capita expenditures (spending estimates in this study do not account for a reduction in government spending that is already being directed toward the uninsured). The authors credit a healthier and older population of newly eligible enrollees for the lower incremental spending per enrollee, compared with existing enrollees, because the majority of children with substantial health problems already would have been enrolled under Medicaid's provisions for the medically needy. Increases in utilization may also not be as large under a Medicaid expansion if new enrollees are unable to find physicians who are willing to treat Medicaid patients because of low reimbursement rates.
It is difficult to project how reductions in uncompensated care that result from Medicaid/SCHIP expansions may affect overall capacity, particularly given current rates of reimbursement in this program. In their study of the relationship between public sector health policy changes on for-profit and nonprofit hospitals' provision of uncompensated care, Davidoff and colleagues (2000) found that uncompensated care provided by for-profit hospitals declined relative to Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansions. They did not, however, find the same to be true among nonprofit hospitals.
References
Banthin JS, Selden TM, "The ABCs of Children's Health Care: How the Medicaid Expansions Affected Access, Burdens, and Coverage Between 1987 and 1996," Inquiry, Vol. 40, No. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 133–145.
Buchmueller TC, Grumbach K, Kronick R, Kahn JG, "The Effect of Health Insurance on Medical Care Utilization and Implications for Insurance Expansion: A Review of the Literature," Medical Care Research and Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, February 1, 2005, pp. 3–30.
Davidoff AJ, LoSasso AT, Bazzoli GJ, Zuckerman S, "The Effect of Changing State Health Policy on Hospital Uncompensated Care," Inquiry, Vol. 37, No. 3, Fall 2000, pp. 253–267.
Gordon LV, Selden TM, "How Much Did the Medicaid Expansions for Children Cost? An Analysis of State Medicaid Spending, 1984–1994," Medical Care Research and Review, Vol. 58, No. 4, December 2001, pp. 482–495.
Holl JL, Szilagyi PG, Rodewald LE, Shone LP, Zwanziger J, Mukamel DB, Trafton S, Dick AW, Barth R, Raubertas RF, "Evaluation of New York State's Child Health Plus: Access, Utilization, Quality of Care, and Health Status," Pediatrics, Vol. 105, No. 3, Suppl., March 2000, pp. 711–718.
Mitchell JB, Haber SG, Khatutsky G, Donoghue S, "Impact of the Oregon Health Plan on Access and Satisfaction of Adults with Low Income," Health Services Research, Vol. 37, No. 1, February 2002, pp. 19–39.
Moreno L, Hoag SD, "Covering the Uninsured Through TennCare: Does It Make a Difference?" Health Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 231–239.
Szilagyi PG, Zwanziger J, Rodewald LE, Holl JL, Mukamel DB, Trafton S, Shone LP, Dick AW, Jarrell L, Raubertas RF, "Evaluation of a State Health Insurance Program for Low-Income Children: Implications for State Child Health Insurance Programs," Pediatrics, Vol. 105, No. 2, February 2000, pp. 363–371.
Because the administrative structure already exists, expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility would be relatively simple:
- Past experience with Medicaid and SCHIP expansions suggests that expanding eligibility would be relatively simple to implement. Read more below
- Because both Medicaid and SCHIP are administered at the state level, some variability may occur in the operational feasibility of this mechanism in different states. Read more below
Past experience with Medicaid and SCHIP expansions suggests that expanding eligibility would be relatively simple to implement.
Expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility is expected to be relatively simple to implement because such a measure would be an incremental change to a long-standing program. Changes in Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility have been implemented with relative ease in the past and require no new methods or procedures. Evidence has also shown that expanding eligibility has positive spillover effects for both programs. For example, Medicaid experienced a substantial increase in the number of enrolled children after the implementation of SCHIP, and extending eligibility to parents of uninsured but eligible children increased the number of enrolled children. Administrative procedures could be simplified by relying solely on income eligibility, rather than using a combination of categorical and income eligibility criteria.
There could be some differences across states or counties in implementing changes in SCHIP or Medicaid eligibility because of variation across states in existing eligibility, as well as whether there are sufficient resources available to pay for additional enrollees.
Studies of past Medicaid or SCHIP expansions have shown them to be implemented relatively quickly and with few implementation challenges. Evidence from a congressionally mandated evaluation of SCHIP implementation in ten states showed that SCHIP was successful in achieving the intent of the program. The study found that SCHIP implementation was accomplished relatively quickly among states and that states developed generous benefit plans, implemented innovative outreach strategies, simplified enrollment and application processes, and expanded coverage and access to the target population (Wooldridge, Kenney, and Trenholm, 2005). Gold, Singh, and Frost (1993), in their evaluation of the implementation of expanding Medicaid eligibility to include pregnant women with incomes slightly above the existing income eligibility cutoff, found that most states implemented the eligibility changes quickly and early in the allowed time period and also introduced other changes, such as dropping asset tests and allowing for continuous enrollment.
Medicaid/SCHIP have substantially reduced the number of uninsured children; however, a large proportion of uninsured individuals is eligible for public coverage but is not enrolled. As of 2005, approximately 62 percent of uninsured children were eligible for public health insurance coverage (Hudson, Selden, 2007). The prevalence of uninsured but eligible individuals indicates that some administrative or other barriers exist that could reduce the success of any efforts to expand eligibility.
States that had more expansive outreach efforts and had streamlined their enrollment processes were most successful in covering uninsured pregnant women. In their assessment of SCHIP's successes and challenges since its inception, Kenney and Change (2004) argue that SCHIP was implemented relatively quickly by almost all states, and that the information and technical assistance provided by government stakeholders allowed for such quickness and ease. However, the authors also documented that the expeditious implementation of SCHIP resulted in some problems. For example, some states had drafted plans before the federal government released its eligibility standards, which resulted in some mismatches between federal and state implementation plans, but the mismatches were later resolved.
Increasing eligibility has been shown to improve enrollment among eligible but uninsured children and families. Several studies have shown that expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility to include parents of eligible children increases enrollment among uninsured but eligible children (Artiga and Mann, 2007). Selden, Hudson, and Banthin (2004) used 1996 to 2002 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data to determine eligibility and coverage rates over time and produced results showing that coverage rates of children improved substantially under both SCHIP and Medicaid. The authors argue that Medicaid/SCHIP enrollment increased even though most outreach and enrollment efforts were directed toward SCHIP, indicating important positive spillover effects for Medicaid/SCHIP.
Medicaid/SCHIP programs have substantially reduced the number of uninsured children; however, a large proportion of uninsured individuals is eligible for public coverage but is not enrolled. As of 2005, approximately 62 percent of uninsured children were eligible for public health insurance coverage (Hudson and Selden, 2007). The prevalence of uninsured but eligible individuals indicates that some administrative or other barriers exist that could reduce the success of any efforts to expand eligibility.
Because both Medicaid and SCHIP are administered at the state level, some variability may occur in the operational feasibility of this mechanism in different states.
State flexibility in implementing Medicaid and SCHIP has resulted in variations and inequities across states, which could influence operational feasibility. SCHIP legislation allowed states to expand existing Medicaid programs, implement a separate insurance program for children, or establish some combination of both. Operating two separate low income insurance programs—Medicaid and SCHIP—within a state can create administrative complexity and program fragmentation, which results in unnecessary dropouts and switching between programs. Sommers (2005) analyzed dropout and switching rates in states that had separate Medicaid and SCHIP programs against rates in states with combined programs. The study found that dropout rates were 45 percent higher in states with separate Medicaid and SCHIP programs than in states that had combined programs; states that changed from combined programs to separate programs—Maryland and South Dakota—experienced statistically significant increases in dropout rates.
Variation across states, such as differences in program administrative structures, could influence operational feasibility in some states more than in others. States have used a number of strategies to improve the enrollment process of newly eligible individuals by using such means as presumptive eligibility (a mechanism by which an applicant can obtain benefits and care during the time period that his or her actual eligibility is being determined) and continuous enrollment for 12 months. In contrast, fiscal challenges in states, which have increased in recent months, may affect the degree to which states want to encourage enrollment in these programs. In some cases, states have specifically implemented barriers to enrollment to limit program numbers. Many eligible individuals remain uninsured.
A number of studies have identified barriers to enrollment that may influence the success of expanding Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility for increasing coverage. In an effort to limit enrollment in the face of state level fiscal pressures and to reduce crowd out of private coverage, states may require that enrollees frequently prove their eligibility, making it more likely that individuals will drop out of the program (Fairbrother et al., 2004). Many states use waiting periods, during which the individual must be uninsured, before allowing enrollment, or they may impose cost sharing to discourage people from dropping their other coverage (Davidson, Blewett, and Call, 2004). Application processes can be complex, and people may not know that they are eligible for the program (Haley and Kenney, 2007). Bansak and Raphael (2007) evaluated design features of SCHIP programs that affect take–up, or participation, rates; they found that eliminating asset tests, offering continuous coverage, simplifying the application and enrollment processes, and extending benefits to parents all had positive effects on take–up rates, whereas mandatory waiting periods reduced take–up rates.
References
Artiga S, Mann C, Family Coverage Under SCHIP Waivers, Washington, D.C.: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Issue Brief No. 7644, May 2007.
Bansak C, Raphael S, "The Effects of State Policy Design Features on Take–Up and Crowd–Out Rates for the State Children's Health Insurance Program," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management [Epub November 29, 2006], Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2007, pp. 149–175.
Davidson G, Blewett LA, Call KT, Public Program Crowd-Out of Private Coverage: What Are the Issues? Princeton, N.J.: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Research Synthesis Report No. 5, June 2004.
Fairbrother D, Dutton MJ, Bachrach D, Newell K-A, Boozang P, Cooper R, "Costs of Enrolling Children in Medicaid and SCHIP," Health Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1, January/February 2004, pp. 237–243.
Gold RB, Singh S, Frost J, "The Medicaid Eligibility Expansion for Pregnant Women: Evaluating the Strength of State Implementation Efforts," Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 25, No. 5, September–October 1993, pp. 196–207.
Haley J, Kenney G, "Low–Income Uninsured Children with Special Health Care Needs: Why Aren't They Enrolled in Public Health Insurance Programs?" Pediatrics, Vol. 119, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 60–68.
Hudson JL, Selden TM, "Children's Eligibility and Coverage: Recent Trends and a Look Ahead," Health Affairs, Web Exclusives [Epub August 16, 2007], Vol. 26, No. 5, September/October 2007, pp. w618–w629.
Kenney G, Change DI, "The State Children's Health Insurance Program: Successes, Shortcomings, and Challenges," Health Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 5, September/October 2004, pp. 51–62.
Selden T, Hudson JL, Banthin JS, "Tracking Changes in Eligibility and Coverage Among Children, 1996–2002," Health Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 5, September/October 2004, pp. 39–50.
Sommers BD, "The Impact of Program Structure on Children's Disenrollment from Medicaid and SCHIP," Health Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 6, November/December 2005, pp. 1611–1618.
Wooldridge J, Kenney G, Trenholm C, Congressionally Mandated Evaluation of the State Children's Health Insurance Program: Final Report to Congress, Princeton, N.J.: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., and Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, October 26, 2005.
Analysis of Options Sub Pages
- Overview
- Individual Mandate
- Employer Mandate
- Purchasing Pools
- Refundable Tax Credit
- Medicaid/SCHIP Eligibility
- Open Access to Government Employee Program
- High Deductible Health Plans
- Hospital Pay for Performance
- Physician Pay for Performance
- Bundled Payment
- Comparative Effectiveness
- Health IT
- Disease Management
- Medical Malpractice
